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CONGRESSIONAL REFORM: TOWARD A MODERN CONGRESS
Bruce R. Hopkins*
I. Introduction
"The interest of the [movants] seeking to intervene is ... in not being
deprived of information which would normally flow to them but for an interven-
ing act of government restraining that flow." The foregoing language is from a
brief in support of a motion to intervene in a United States District Court case.'
This was no ordinary motion to intervene, however, but was an unusual (albeit
unsuccessful) attempt by representatives of one branch of the United States
Government to intervene in a case on the side of a private party being proceeded
against by officials of another branch of the Government. The petitioners were
twenty-seven members of the United States House of Representatives, seeking to
intervene in United States v. The Washington Post Campany,' so as to be in a
position to contend that a preliminary injunction should not be granted to enjoin
the defendant newspaper from publishing materials from "History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy," a classified Department of Defense
task force study on the origins of the involvement of the United States in Viet-
nam.
3
This abortive attempt by a handful of congressmen to intervene in a federal
proceeding is one of many illustrations of the plight of the Congress in its efforts to
obtain adequate and current information to competently deal with the policy
questions confronting it. This struggle with the executive branch for information
is well known to the most casual of observers, yet there is little indication that
the legislative branch is making much headway in the competition. But what is
truly striking about the congressmen's brief for intervention is its candid admission
that members of Congress, who under the United States Constitution are mem-
bers of a branch of the federal government supposedly co-equal with the executive
and judicial branches, are heavily reliant upon the public press and other general
media for information required in attempting to carry out their official, consti-
tutional functions. Thus, the aforementioned brief speaks of a "pressing public
need for immediate access to matters directly and importantly affecting [the]
ongoing process in Congress" and states that the "deliberations and actions [of
the movants] in participating in the formulation of national policy are crippled
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar; B.A., University of Michigan, 1964; J.D.,
George Washington University, 1967; LL.M, George Washington University, 1971. Mr.
Hopkins, a former congressional assistant, has written several articles on the Congress and "con-
gressional reform."
1 Brief in Support of Motion for Intervention, United States v. The Washington Post
Company- ........ F. Supp ......... '(D D.C. 1971), reprinted at 117 CONG. REc. E6356-60 (daily
ed. June 23, 1971). See also Brief of 27 Members of Congress as Amici Curiae, New York
Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), reprinted at 117 CONG. RFc. E6703-6
(daily ed. June 29, 1971). These cases are discussed at 57 A.B.A.J. 918-9, 926-7 (1971).
2 ........ F. Supp ......... (D.D.C. 1971).
3 Portions of these documents were subsequently published, following unauthorized public
disclosure. SHEEHAN, et al., TEE PENTAGON PAPERS (1971). Forty-three volumes were
subsequently published by the U.S. Government. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES-
VIETNAM RELATIONS 1945-1967 (1971).
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and inhibited by not having highly pertinent information which is known to
exist." For these and many other reasons, the legislative branch of the federal
government is too often regarded as the "sapless branch."5
Bridging this "information gap" is one of the many goals of adherents of
congressional reform. But lack of material information is only one aspect of the
inadequacies of the Congress and is only one of many indications of the critical
need for congressional reorganization and refurbishing. Congressional reform in
general means nothing less than the overall revitalization of the legislative branch
of the United States Government, a reconstruction of the House and Senate
through the discard of anachronistic practices, and the adoption of twentieth-
century procedures and utilization of contemporary techniques, to enable the
Congress to effectively perform for modem-day America.
The legal profession has generally ignored the legislative branch, in prefer-
ence to the presidency, the myriad federal departments and agencies, and the
courts, in its endeavors to study and make recommendations for improvements in
the structure of government. "Today's lawyer," wrote Professors of Law Charles
B. Nutting and Shelden D. Elliott, "even more than his professional ancestors,
must know how to work with both the processes and the products of the legislative
branch of government."6 Today's lawyer should also be familiar with develop-
ments surrounding the efforts, accomplished and proposed, to reorganize the
institutions of statutory law-making, as part of an overall understanding of-if
not appreciation for-the legislative process. George B. Galloway once asserted
that "there are few things more important than an inquiry into the organization
and operation of our national legislature and methods of improving its efficiency."'
This article, premised on that belief, is predicated on the thesis that congressional
reform merits the attention and the ideas of the legal profession.
II. The Significance of Congressional Reform
The United States Congress is not, of course, completely in reliance upon
the general information media for its information. Nor can it be accurately said
that the Congress plays no meaningful role in our system of national government
or has no substantive impact on the development of national policy. To the
contrary, the underlying hypothesis of those who are seriously concerned with
modernization of the Congress is that a competent, effective, and responsive
federal government is heavily dependent upon a responsible-and adaptable-
national legislature. Congress is, as the Committee for Economic Development
declared, "the keystone in the governmental arch."' But the Congress has
4 Supra note 1. at E6356.
5 The term "sapless branch" as applied to the Congress apparently originated with Ken-
neth Crawford. See NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1963, p. 31. See also J. CLARK, CONGRESS: THE
SAPLESS BRA:NCH (1964).
6 C. NUTTING, S. ELLIOTT, AND Ri. DICKERSON, OASES ON LEGISLATION x (4th ed. 1969).
7 G. GALLOWAY, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN CONGRESS 645 (1953) (reprinted by
permission of Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York). Prof. Daniel J. Dykstra concurs with those
"who feel that as a [legal] profession we have been remiss in our attention to legislative
activities." Dykstra, The History Of A Legislative Power Struggle, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 402, 403
(1966).
8 COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MAKING CONGRESS MORE EFFECTIVE
(1970) (by permission of Committee for Economic Development, New York).
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abandoned much of its earlier power, has all too often been the mere attender
to legislative details while the President exercises nearly the whole of national
leadership, and has displayed an unhealthy inability--or, more accurately, un-
willingness--to organize and function as a contemporary institution of govern-
ment.
The decade of the 1960's witnessed among the American public the
beginnings of a deterioration in respect for and faith in their national government.
There has been a growing malaise, a creeping belief that the problems besetting
the United States are too great for the government, as presently structured, to
cope with and resolve. Collaterally, there has evolved a general disbelief of the
national government, ranging from cynicism in the face of official dogma to
pessimism as a reaction to the unveiling of proposed programs. (It was in the
middle of this decade that the term "credibility gap" came into popular usage.)
The confidence of the American people in their governmental institutions seems
to be declining.9
Like many institutions in the United States, the Congress is struggling to
weather (in addition to a decline in public confidence) an onrush of tremendous
changes, discoveries, and innovations. The industrial epoch has produced extra-
ordinary growth, technological progress, and socioeconomic upheavals. Repre-
sentative Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) has pointed out, as illustrations of the cor-
respondingly vast increase in the congressional workload, that there were 144 bills
introduced in the First Congress in contrast to 25,215 measures proffered in the
91st Congress, a $4.3 million budget during the First Congress in comparison to
$210.3 billion in expenditures generated by the 91st Congress, and that today's
House member has a constituency of about 470,000 while his 1790 counterpart
represented only 30,000 people.1" The convergence of these forces within the
sphere of the federal government has greatly expanded the responsibilities of the
Congress and has correspondingly magnified the expectations of Americans of
(and thus their disappointments in) their national legislature. Most congressional
reforms are, therefore, intended to empower the Congress to cope with change
and to remain relevant. Suggestions for reorganization of the Congress are
propounded to enable the legislative branch to master what Representative
Bertram L. Podell terms the "new realities,"'1 to revamp itself in the face of ever-
increasing demands and ever-accelerating obligations.
Not coincidentally, the 1960's also saw continuing aggregation of power
and authority in national affairs unto the presidency. While noting that the
Congress is far from powerless, John Bibby and Roger Davidson express concern
9 See, e.g., Goodwin, Sources of the Public Unhappiness, THE NEw YORKER, Jan. 4,
1969. at 38. William Pfaff observes: "The public confidence in government and the citizens'
compact with one another-that sense of common enterprise which is necessary to democracy-
are seriously weakened today." Pfaff, Less Rhetoric, More Reform, Wash. Post, Sept. 26, 1971,
at E4. While it is dangerous to overly rely upon, let alone generalize from, public opinion polls,
it should be noted that, as of this writing, the current administration's popularity among voting-
age citizens, as recorded by the Gallup poll, has been hovering around the 50% approval mark,
while the Harris Survey has determined that nearly two-thirds of a nationwide sample regard
the performance of Congress as "only fair" or "poor," with only 25% expressing an "excellent"
or "pretty good" rating-the lowest since the question was first asked by the survey in 1963.
10 Remarks of Representative Hamilton, 116 CoNG. REc. E11084 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 1971).
11 Remarks of Representative Podell, 115 CONG. Rzc. E2725 (daily ed. April 3, 1969).
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that it "is losing its vitality to an even stronger presidency and an even more
complex bureaucracy."1 2 This process was unduly hastened by the deepening
involvement of this country in the war in Vietnam, a development presided over
by a succession of Presidents while the Congress was generally a passively agree-
able bystander. Principally because of the general disconcertion toward the na-
ture of our undertakings in Vietnam and the procedures of decision-making by
which we became embedded there, few Americans manifest any notable degree of
confidence in presidential omniscience. However, any decline of an institution of
government in the public eye does not by any means insure an automatic transfer
of respect and support to another institution (such as from the presidency to the
Congress). Rather, such a decline produces only widespread disaffection and
frustration, and a general disinclination toward affairs of government pending
a notable success or the demands of an emergency. Largely unconcerned with
rhetoric or doctrine as such, Americans generally display a pragmatic attitude
toward the institutions of representative government. Says Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr.: "Since the point is not to vindicate abstractions but to get the best possible
policies for the country, the citizen's obligation surely is to throw his weight to
one side or another [between the Congress and the presidency] depending on the
practical results desired."' 3 The people of the United States are currently waiting
to see signs of a new attitude by the government toward the governed, a refurbish-
ing of public institutions to produce a viable, effective government for the coming
decades.
Revolution is the solution advanced by some. Others see some answers in
democratic processes and in conformance to the system of institutional interplay
so carefully constructed by the makers of the United States Constitution. The
structure of national government contemplated in the Constitution has as one of
its basic features a dynamic and effective legislative branch. But in past years
there has been a severe deviation from this fundamental concept of representative
government. Stagnation in the Congress and silent acquiescence of the general
public have greatly contributed to an excessive accumulation of power and re-
sponsibility in the executive branch. Simultaneously, many citizens feel powerless
to make any contribution to governmental decision-making or to impact the
direction of national policy.
Nowhere is the present-day imbalance in function and responsibility between
the presidency and the Congress more vividly illustrated than in the area of war-
making. Despite express provisions in the United States Constitution that the
Congress has the power to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and
maintain a navy, and other relevant powers (including the "power of the purse"),
recent Presidents have gathered to themselves-some would say usurped--sub-
stantially complete unilateral discretion as to the exercise of the war power.
Merlo J. Pusey has written that "[clommitment of the nation to war by executive
12 J. BIBBY AND R. DAVIDSON, ON CAPITOL HILL 3 (1967) (reprinted by permission of
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York).
13 A. SCHLESINGER AND A. DE GRAzrA, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY: THEIR ROLE IN
MODERN TiMES 102 (1967) (reprinted by permission of the American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, Wash., D.C.).
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action has very nearly become an established practice,"1 4 a practice which is a
violation of our constitutional system of government and an encroachment upon
what is "clearly and unmistakably a job for the nation's law-makers."1 5 As
illustrated by this country's involvement in Vietnam and specifically by the almost
unanimous congressional acceptance and unthinking passage of the Tonkin
Resolution, the Congress has fallen into a state of subservience relative to the
executive branch as respects the war-making power, notwithstanding the clear
grants of authority in the Constitution. The outcome of our Vietnam involvement
is, however, engendering considerable re-evaluation of "the way we go to war"
and has produced more evidence of the dangers inherent in tolerating the existence
of a servile national legislature. One of the lessons of Vietnam is the need for,
and the contemporary significance of, congressional reform.
Consequently, one of the phenomena of national development early into the
1970's appears to be a significant disenchantment with the Government as
presently constituted at the same time one branch of Government, the executive
branch, is drawing to it greater power and influence. (As subsequent discussions
will indicate, there is growing insurgency within the Congress, evidence of a
reassertion of greater participation in domestic and foreign policy-making.) Aside
from any need for re-evaluation of the role of the executive and the attendant
bureaucracy, these developments (probably related) may suggest, they also are
noteworthy support for the proposition that an independently strong and objective
Congress is essential to the United States Government.
The thrust of congressional reform is an effort to reorganize the Congress in
line with the requirements-and the challenges--of contemporary American
society. As noted earlier, preservation of the Congress is premised on the theory
that the national legislature plays a meaningful and indispensable role in the
scheme of federal government, and thus congressional reform is but a component
of what should be ongoing governmental reform. The basic design of our national
government is, of course, constitutionally ordained; the ultimate goal of congres-
sional reform is continuance of-many would say the restoration of-the funda-
mentals of the constitutional arrangement. Thus, Eugene H. Methvin placed
congressional reform in the appropriate context when he wrote: "Unless Congress
modernizes its procedures and organization, it will destroy itself as a crucial force
in our constitutional system.""0
This, then, is the significance of congressional reform. It means nothing less
than the reinvigoration of a vital institution of the federal government. It means
the resurgence of the national legislature as a full partner with the executive in
the formulation of policy. It means checking and then reversing the great erosion
of the role and authority of the Congress relative to that envisioned in the scheme
of government embodied in the United States Constitution. It means a reawaken-
ing in the Congress, a realization that it is not preordained that the Congress be
subservient to the occupant of the White House, and a recognition, within and
without the Government, that it is the destiny of the Congress to resume the
14 M. PusEy, THE WAY WE Go TO WAR 76 (1969) (reprinted by permission of the
Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, Mass.).
15 Id. at 160.
16 Methvin, Is Congress Destroying Itself? THE READER'S DXoasT, April, 1969, at 65.
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posture of a co-equal participant with the executive in the conduct of the nation's
affairs.
III. Congressional Reform in Perspective
A. The Role of Congress
A rational discussion of congressional reform must be preceded by a general
conception of the fundamental character of the Congress. Suggestions for re-
structuring the legislative branch often appear indefectible in theory but lack
practical relevance to the functions the institution is expected to perform. Once
the basic congressional role is in perspective, then the multitudinous reforms
advanced can be more accurately appraised.
The "official" document of the federal government describing the legislative
process, authored by the late Dr. Charles J. Zinn, states the principal purpose of
the Congress: "The chief function of the Congress is the making of laws."'
Thus, the Constitution vests in the Congress "[a]ll legislative powers herein
granted." Article I, section 8, specifies a number of express powers, including
the authority to levy taxes, borrow money, regulate commerce, declare war, and
"provide for the common defense and general welfare" of the United States.
Beyond these and other stated powers, the Congress has the general power "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for carrying into execution
the express powers and other powers vested by the Constitution elsewhere in the
national government. On this constitutional foundation rests the lawmaking func-
tion of Congress, and from which its other major functions derive their support.
As Stephen K. Bailey wrote, "[t]he other powers of Congress-to appropriate, to
investigate, to mediate, to alleviate, and to repudiate-are all based on its power
to legislate.""8 Lawmaking is, then, the essence of the role of the Congress, and
every congressional reform proposal should be previewed in the context of what
its impact, should the reform be adopted, would be on Congress' "chief function,"
the making of laws.
Despite the latter-day tendency for major legislation to originate from
within the executive branch and the delegation of rulemaking authority to a
multitude of regulatory agencies, the lawmaking function remains as the Congress'
prime role. But as Dr. Zinn indicated, there is today more to the raison d'tre of
the Congress than lawmaking. One of the Congress' most important contempo-
rary functions is to oversee the administration of the federal government. This
function is continuously carried out by the House and Senate Committees on Ap-
propriations, as well as through hearings, staff studies, and other inquiries by the
standing legislative committees and the special committees. Performance of the
oversight function (newly termed "legislative review"'), as defined by the rules
of the House and Senate, requires each standing committee to "review and study,
on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those
17 C. ZINN, How OUR LAws Aim MADE 3, H.R. Doc. No. 91-127, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969).
18 S. BALEY, Tim Naw CONGRESS viii (1966) (reprinted by permission of the author).
19 See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 § 118, 84 Stat. 1140. 1156 (1970).
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laws, or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that
committee."2 Congressional oversight is a principal component of the constitu-
tional power to supervise and control federal expenditures, and is another of the
Congress' cardinal functions.
A third major function of the contemporary Congress is representation of
the national citizenry in the policymaking processes of the federal government.
Most members of the House and Senate devote considerable energy to serving-
and articulating-the needs and demands of their constituents. Although per-
formance of the representative function has its burdensome and time-consuming
(and occasionally unsavory) aspects, congressmen do afford the nation's populace
a voice in Washington and, conversely, often contribute to discussion of public
issues--a related, educational function.
The present-day Congress has, therefore, three prime roles: legislative,
oversight of administration, and representative/education. While the Congress
has a host of explicit and inferred powers for fulfilling these roles, the national
legislature has numerous other powers not readily identifiable with any of the
triumvirate of chief powers. The Congress has various housekeeping and rule-
making powers.2 The Senate is required to confirm most of the nominations to
major government posts made by the President, and advises and consents to
treaties.22 The House has the power of impeachment of officeholders" and the
Senate the power to try the charges. 4 Many of these powers, such as to propose
amendments to the Constitution,2 5 to admit new states into the Union,2" and to
provide for the succession to the presidency,27 while they serve to round out the
picture of congressional authority, are not within the usual concern of congres-
sional reform.
It is not enough, however, to simply enumerate the powers of the Congress.
Students of the Congress must also come to understand how it wields these
powers.2 The most elementary tenet of congressional operations is that, for the
most part, the work of the Congress is done in its standing committees. Gen-
erally, the fate of legislation hinges on these semi-autonomous bastions of power,
the "little legislatures." " Through committee hearings and investigations, the
Congress exercises considerable control over the administrative departments and
agencies of the federal government (oftentimes, the sheer threat of inquiry by a
congressional committee can occasion a shift in administrative practices).
Whether in committee or on the floor, singularly or collectively, members of the
20 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 92nd Cong., Rule XI, clause 28(a). (The
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 92nd Cong., appear as H.R. Doc. No. 439, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).) The comparable provision as applicable to the Senate appears as
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, § 136(a), 2 U.S.C. § 290d.
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; art. I, § 3; art. I, § 5.
22 Id. at art. II, § 2.
23 Id. at art. I, § 2.
24 Id. at art. I, § 3.
25 Id. at art. V.
26 Id. at art. IV, § 3.
27 Id. at art. II, § 1.
28 Among the better analyses of the Congress are: G. GALLOWAY, THE LEGIsLATrV
PROCESS IN CONGRESS (1953); B. GROSS, THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE (1953); and R. YOUNG,
THE AMERICAN CONGRESS (1958). The classical study of the Congress remains W. WILSON,
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885).
29 See generally W. MORROW, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES (1969).
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House and Senate can employ what is, in a very real sense, the ultimate power-
the power of legitimization. Being generally recognized as a representative
assembly, the Congress can legitimize political leadership and political decisions
exercised and made elsewhere in the Government."
Finally, the relative importance of and the means by which these funda-
mental congressional roles are accomplished must constantly be examined in the
context of contemporary circumstances and requirements. For example, to what
extent can the Congress carry out its traditional study and deliberative functions-
an important aspect of its legislative role-in a complex society rapidly undergoing
dynamic social, economic and technological transformations? Or, how is the
Congress to competently monitor the overall administration of the federal govern-
ment-that is, to be overseer of the burgeoning federal agencies and departments
-absent modem techniques of systems analysis? Congressional reformers cannot
assume that the functions of the Congress, including the traditional trio of chief
roles, are immutable. Nor can the functions of the legislative branch be con-
sidered without also weighing, in context, the powers assigned to the executive
and judicial branches of the national government, and the authority reserved to
the states.
The Congress, therefore, plays a variety of roles having shifting emphases
in the scheme of national government, in light of which the feasibility and impact
of congressional reorganization proposals must be examined.
B. Some Further Pieliminary Perspectives
The various roles and functions of the Congress must, as discussed, be kept
constantly in the easily accessible background when approaching the subject of
congressional reform. Additionally, there are some other perspectives to be ap-
preciated, relating to the existing structure, organization and traditions of the
Congress, as well as to the parameters of the subject of congressional reform
itself.
Congressional "reform" is a deceptively simple and easily misleading term,
as the concept can mean many things depending upon the beholder. The term
covers a wide range of reorganization and other proposals, from abolishment of
the seniority system to clarification of the Congressional Record, from reorganiza-
tion of the jurisdiction of standing committees to modification of the pay system
for congressional employees, or from the application of computer techniques to
technical variations in procedural rules. "'Reform' is a tricky word; change
per se is not necessarily the same as progress," writes House Minority Leader
Gerald R. Ford.3' Many may agree that the Congress requires reorganization;
many will differ as to the aspects of congressional operation and organization
which require reform and how reforms are to be accomplished.
The chief emphasis of congressional reform has traditionally been procedural
reform, partially because procedural change is relatively easy to implement and
30 See J. BrIBY AND R. DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 9.
31 M. MCINNIS (ed.), WE PROPOSE: A MODERN CONGRESS Xii (1966) (reprinted by per-
mission of McGraw-HiU, Inc., New York).
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can often be achieved as a substitute for more meaningful, structural reform.
Congressional reorganization proposals which principally envision modification
of the procedures of the House and Senate tend to reflect, as in Joseph Kraft's
observation, "the populist view that . . . if [congressional] procedure was only
democratized and opened up, everything would come right." 2 At the same time,
what may initially appear to be a mere procedural reform can prove to have con-
siderable substantive influence on congressional operations. The impact an
alteration in the rules of procedure can have on the decision-making processes in
Congress and on the legislative output was vividly illustrated early in the first
session of the 92nd Congress, when the House, in casting its first recorded vote on
the question of federal assistance for development of a supersonic transport plane,
reversed its position of seven years and voted to end the controversial subsidy.
There were a number of factors behind the turnabout, but foremost among them
was the newly created recorded teller vote, 3 which forced House members to take
a position in the public eye. 4 Nonetheless, procedural reform is often makeshift
reform-a response to public insistence that the Congress improve its practices
by scattered tinkering with isolated aspects of congressional operations to contrive
the appearance of authentic reform of the Congress.
Overaccentuation of the importance of congressional procedure fails to take
into account the many aspects of the organization of the Congress which are
largely extraneous to House and Senate rules, being writ in the consequences of
party government, federalism, the system of coordinate checks and balances, and
the doctrine of separation of powers. (On this latter point, the term "separation
of powers" is somewhat of a misnomer, as the more accurate designation is
separate institutions sharing power; Dean Ernest S. Griffith describes the re-
lationship as "institutional mutual responsibility of coequals." 3 ) As David B.
Truman wrote: "Most discussions of congressional 'reform' focus on these items
[congressional procedural practices], or a fraction of them, without substantial
reference to the two more fundamental sources of dissatisfaction [the constitu-
tional separation of the Congress and the executive, and the federalized govern-
mental structure] and as if the criticized procedures were awkward bits of
machinery wholly without deeper origins or justifying function."" Thus, some
aspects of congressional organization are proper subjects for explicit rules of
parliamentary procedure, while others are the domain of party judgment in the
House and Senate. Yet all are blithely categorized under the rubric of congres-
sional "reform."
A congressional "reform" proposal, therefore, should be explored, preferably
in advance of its proposition and certainly prior to its adoption, to ascertain
whether any side effects therefrom would have as consequential an-or a greater
-impact on the congressional structure as would the desired reorganization, such
32 Kraft, The Reform Congress, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1971, at A17.
33 See text accompanying note 194, infra.
34 See Broder, SST: Hill Reform Victim, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 1971, at A19.
35 See R. NEUSTADT, PNESENTIAL POWER 33 (1960).
36 E. GRIFFITH, CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE 7 '(3rd ed. 1961) (reprinted by
permission of the New York University Press).
37 D. TRUMAN, THE CONGRESS AND AMERICA'S FUTURE 3 (1965) (reprinted by permission
of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.).
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as by unintentionally modifying the distribution of power within either house or
between the Congress and the President. As Congressman Ford advised: "Each
and every proposal for reform of Congress must be weighed against other sug-
gested reforms, and all must be weighed in the balance of power between the
branches of government."3 8 Elimination of the seniority system, severe curtailment
of the filibuster,"0 or grant of an item veto to the President are examples of
"reform" which could occasion unintended consequences, in contrast to recom-
mendations such as a summer recess for the Congress40 or the use of recycled
paper in preparation of the Congressional Record.4
While congressional reform is a broad and pervasive subject, there are topics
relevant to the organization and operation of the legislative branch which often
seem outside the traditional scope of congressional reform. Although concep-
tions of what are or are not points of congressional reform may differ, there are a
number of topics-admittedly having an important bearing on the quality of
the Congress-which are not considered herein. These are: campaign financing,42
financial disclosure, development and enforcement of a congressional code of
ethics, regulation of lobbying activity, congressional districting, and the problem
of conflicts of interest. 3 There are other topics untreated herein falling squarely
within the sphere of constitutional law: presidential impoundment of appropri-
ated funds,4 4 presidential exercise of the pocket veto during a congressional
recess,45 and the hoary dilemma of executive privilege versus congressional in-
vestigation." These significant subjects-important as they are for believers in
a strong and independent Congress-have been somewhat arbitarily sacrificed
herein to discussion of other avenues to reorganization and reform of the Con-
gress.
Finally, the obvious must be said: There are practical limitations on the
effect that formal changes in legislative procedure and practice can have in im-
38 I. McINNIS, supra note 31, at xii. Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and
Michael 0. Leary put it this way: "Any proposed change [in congressional organization] must
be examined closely for its probable effects, and not simply for its conformity to abstract models
of neat or orderly structure. If we adopt reform A, we ought to be reasonably certain it will
lead to desired result X rather than undesired results Y or Z." Hearings Before the Joint Com-
mittee on the Organization of the Congress, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 749 (1965) [hereinafter
ICOC Hearings].
39 See text accompanying notes 280-3, infra.
40 See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 § 461, 84 Stat. 1140, 1193 (1970).
41 See, e.g., S. 2267, H.R. 10116, 10117, and 10451, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The
concept of "neutral" reform proposals, as opposed to those which would cause a "dispersion
of power," is discussed in D. TRumAN, supra note 37, at 178-80.
42 See S. 382, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), the proposed Federal Elections Campaign
Act of 1971, which has passed the Senate and House, and is expected to clear Congress early
in 1972.
43 See Lee, Conflict of Interest: One Aspect of Congress' Problems, 32 GEo. WASH. L. Rav.
954 (1964).
44 See Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEo.
WASH. L. Rav. 124 (1969). There are a number of proposals for a Joint Committee
on Impoundment of Funds, e.g., S. Con. Res. 13, H.R. Con. Res. 244, 260, 265, 284, 285,
286, and 295, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also S.2581 (the proposed Impoundment
Procedures Bill) and S. 2604 (the proposed Federal Impoundment Information Act), 92nd
Cong., lst Sess. (1971).
45 During the 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers
conducted hearings on the pocket veto power of the President. See S. REP. No. 92-360, 92nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
46 See Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 1044(1965).
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proving and upgrading the Congress. Writing of the problems inherent in chang-
ing the national government, Wilfred E. Binkley wrote that "[w]e will un-
doubtedly be compelled to develop some better American procedures and habits to
displace some unsatisfactory ones," although "reliance upon organizational
changes alone has proved pretty futile in the past."" The quality of the Congress
is in no small measure dependent upon the devotion, diligence and honesty of
the men and women who are elected to the House and Senate and staff the
legislative branch. Likewise, relations between the national legislature and the
President-in instances of conflict or rapport-are often personal, and not readily
susceptible to organizational management. The concept of comity underlies con-
gressional-executive relationships. Excess trust in formal reforms of Congress will
end in frustration and ultimately disillusionment. Even in the case of the impos-
ing Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, notes Binkley, the new rules were
"not in effect six months before profound disappointment was being expressed
over how much Congress was still like Congress.""8 These anti-reform thoughts
were aptly summarized by a former member of the House who declared: "It is
those who magnify gadgets and seek to cure the grudges that attend their mal-
functioning who will be disappointed at any and every reorganization of Con-
gress."" Nonetheless, congressional reform-despite its sometime inefficacies and
contradictions-is an essential and continuing undertaking if the Congress is to
be preserved as an integral unit of national government.
The foregoing brief observations are intended to place the subject of con-
gressional reform in its appropriate setting. Perhaps the simplest perspective from
which to view the subject is that offered by Henry George speaking of social
reform in general; to paraphrase, reorganization and reform of the Congress is
to be secured by "the awakening of thought and the progress of ideas."
IV. The Congressional "Information Gap"
In Federalist Paper No. 53 (written by either Alexander Hamilton or James
Madison), it is stated that "[n]o man can be a competent legislator who does not
add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge
of the subjects on which he is to legislate." Despite this still-timely admonition,
the Congress remains somewhere in the nineteenth century as regards the narrow
scope of information largely utilized to develop legislative decisions, and the
antiquated methods by which information is received, processed and disseminated.
Congress' principal source of information is its system of standing, joint, and
special committees-the same source of information that the Congress has chiefly
relied upon since early into the 1800's. The individual congressman relies on his
staff for much of his research assistance,"0 and for additional information as well
47 W. BINKLEY, THE MAN IN THE WHrrE HousE 158 (1958) (reprinted by permission of
The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md.).
48 Id. at 159.
49 Smith, Review of CONGRESS AT THE CROSSROADS, XXIX SAT. REv. oF LIT. 12 (1946),
quoted in W. BINKLEY, supra note 47, at 159. [The volume reviewed was G. GALLOWAY,
CONGRESS AT THE CROSSROADS (1947).]
50 See Butler, Administering Congress: The Role of the Staff, XXVI PUBLIC ADM. REV. 3
(1966). For further insight into the contemporary role of the congressional staffs see Johnson,
Congressional Staffs: The Third Branch of Congress, Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1970, at Al.
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as for advice on legislation he looks to colleagues possessing the requisite expertise
and to his party leadership. Also, there are available such sources of informa-
tion as the Congressional Record,51 committee and subcommittee reports and
special studies, and transcripts of committee hearings.
For most of the 1900's, the Congress has utilized the services of the Con-
gressional Research Service (formerly the Legislative Reference Service52) within
the Library of Congress and the General Accounting Office. The C.R.S. is the
major research and analytical service arm of the Congress. The Service advises
and assists all committees and individual members of the Congress in the ap-
praisal and evaluation of legislative proposals, and provides information, research,
and reference materials to members of Congress to assist them in their legislative
and representative functions.13 Divisions of the C.R.S. specialize in American
law, education and public welfare, economics, foreign affairs, history and gov-
ernment, library services, and natural resources, and other fields, and the C.R.S.
is served by a phalanx of various specialists.54 The G.A.O. has the responsibility
for investigating all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application
of public funds, and makes its reports available to the Congress. Speaking as
General Counsel for the agency, Robert F. Keller said that "[w]e view the primary
purpose of the [enabling] statues as to require the General Accounting Office to
make for the Congress independent examinations into, the manner in which
government agencies discharge their financial responsibilities.""M
Members of the House and Senate also rely for their information on the
"service functions" of professional lobbying organizations, representatives of the
academic and business communities, other outside consultants, and the public
media. Additionally, members share ideas and obtain information by means of
such informal groups as the Republicans' Wednesday Club and the Democrats'
Democratic Study Group.58
Generally, however, the operational systems of information for the Congress
have changed little in decades. The rapid progress recently made and continuing
in information storage, collation, and retrieval, by computer and otherwise, has
almost bypassed the Congress. Concurrently, however, the Congress-its com-
mittees, members, and staff-have been overwhelmed by immense information
needs and the profusion of information sources (books, articles, reports, and the
51 The Congressional Record is a clearinghouse of information-both important and trivial
-as colorfully portrayed by Robert Bendiner: ". . the Congressional Record, that humanly
contradictory thesaurus of intelligence and gibberish, information and moonshine, courage and
evasion, in which an indulgent tolerance of the absurd is perhaps after all not too high a price
to pay for the occasional voice of wisdom." R. BENDINER, OBSTACLE COURSE ON CAPITOL HILL
(Preface) (1964) (reprinted by permission of McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York). See text ac-
companying notes 425-7, infra.
52 See note 198, infra.
53 See text accompanying notes 199-201, infra.
54 See D. TACHERON AND M. UDALL, THE JOB OF THE CONGRESSMAN 316 (1966)
[Appendix, "Services performed for members by the Legislative Reference Service"].
55 Keller, The Role of the General Accounting Office, 21 Bus. LAW. 259, 260 (1965).
(Mr. Keller is presently serving as Assistant Comptroller General.) See also D. TACHERON
AND M. UDALL, supra note 54, at 318 [Appendix, "Assistance available from the General Ac-
counting Office"], and Nossiter, GAO Walks a Fine Line With Hill Factions, Wash. Post,
Mar. 28. 1971.
56 See generally Dechart, Availability of Information for Congressional Operations, in THE
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, CONGRESS: THE FIRST BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 167
(1966).
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like) which has characterized the "information explosion." Thus, the "space age"
responsibilities and demands being increasingly placed upon the Congress are
overpowering its old-fashioned and diffuse information-handling capabilities.
(Fortunately, as discussed below, the Congress is slowly-but apparently surely-
adapting computer technology to some of its operations.) As Robert L.
Chartrand, Specialist in Information Sciences in the Congressional Research
Service, has noted, "[w]ith increasing frequency, the traditional mechanisms for
handling information within the legislative framework are bogging down.""7
Today, the most striking feature of the information system of the Congress
is its heavy dependence upon the President and the attendant bureaucracy for
information inputs. John S. Saloma III writes: "While Congress may be viewed
as an open system receptive to information from a variety of sources and at
numerous stages in the decision process, it is dependent on information provided
by executive agencies for many of its decisions.""8 Members of Congress often
initiate requests for data and other information with experts and administrative
officials within the departments and agencies of the executive branch. Nearly all
of the major departments and agencies maintain "liaison offices" to handle con-
gressional inquiries.5 " While this source of information is essential for investigating
problems of constituents with the federal government (principally with the mil-
itary services, and agencies such as the Social Security Administration, the Civil
Service Commission, and the Veterans' Administration), congressmen all too
often discover that, in legislative affairs, the legislative branch is informed only to
the extent the executive branch wishes to inform it0 ' Knowledge is power, as
the adage relates, and the decline in congressional power can be at least partially
attributed to the inability of the legislative branch to develop information sources
independent of the executive branch.
One of the basic reasons for the wane of the legislative branch in power and
influence is its inability or refusal to supply itself with current, relevant informa-
tion, coupled with its failure to avail itself of reasonably contemporary informa-
tion storage and retrieval techniques. This was among the conclusions reached
by the Arthur D. Little Company, in its report for the National Broadcasting
Company, entitled "Management Study of the U.S. Congress." The manage-
ment consultant team found that:
Congress is burdened by an ever-increasing workload, caused by continuing
growth of the nation and government, and Congress' failure to relieve itself
57 Chartrand, Congress: The Three-Dimensional Chessboard-The Role of Information
Technology, 1970 RuTGERS J. OF COMP. AND THE LAw 50 (1970), reprinted at 116 CONG. REC.
E7624 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1970).
58 J. SALONIA, CONGRESS AND THE NEw POLITICS 212 (1969) (reprinted by permission of
Little, Brown and Co., Inc., Boston, Mass.).
59 See Pipe, Congressional Liaison: The Executive Branch Consolidates Its Relations with
Congress, XXVI PUBLir ADM. REv. 14 (1966).
60 D. TACHERON and M. UDALL, supra note 54, at 125, relate this apropos anecdote: "Dur-
ing the 89th Congress, the chairman of a House committee had occasion to request a specific item
of information from an Executive department. Attached to the reply he received was a
memorandum from one departmental employee to another. Said the memo--which the
Congressman obviously was not supposed to see-'You'll note we have purposely not answered
the question except in a very indirect way.' " For another illustration see Childs, Legislators
Don't Have Power to Buck Well-Funded Pentagon, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1970, at A25. See
text accompanying notes 94-104, infra.
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of unnecessary work detail. The weight of this workload as felt personally
by legislators is a serious impediment to a greater congressional effectiveness.
6
'
The words of the twenty-seven congressional petitioners are recalled: "[o]ur
deliberations and action.., in participating in the formulation of national policy
are crippled and inhibited by not having highly pertinent information which is
known to exist."1
62
Serious interest in the use of data processing and distribution techniques
through the use of computers for the Congress is a quite recent phenomenon. In
the mid-1960's, some relatively farsighted members of the House and Senate,
and staff assistants, began to realize that, for the Congress to effectively function
in an increasingly complex, technology-oriented society, computerization of data
for congressional use would be a fundamental necessity. Among the very first
to advocate computer support for the Congress was Senator Hubert H. Humphrey
(D-Minn.). Speaking in 1964, Senator Humphrey declared: "When Congress
has better access to the answers it needs, it will be in a position to ask still better-
more useful questions.... The computer could help immeasurably to open up
new vistas for Congress to explore-in our people's behalf.16 3 The first bill intro-
duced in the Congress in this regard was a proposal authored in 1966 by Repre-
sentative Robert McClory (R-Ill.) to authorize the then-named Legislative
Reference Service to make use of automatic data processing (ADP) techniques
and equipment in the performance of its functions.64 On that occasion, Repre-
sentative McClory told his colleagues that they "must move to harness the tech-
nological forces that can provide us with the wherewithal to function more ef-
fectively as public servants."65 A number of bills reflecting the McClory and
similar concepts were introduced during the 90th Congress. For example, Repre-
sentative John G. Dow (D-N.Y.) submitted a proposal which would have given
the Joint Committee on the Library responsibility for overseeing "the policies and
procedures governing the use of automatic data processing by the Legislative
Reference Service."6 Also, Representative William S. Moorhead (D-Pa.)
sponsored legislation in the 90th and again in the 91st Congress to establish a
Joint Committee on Legislative Data Processing to have jurisdiction over con-
gressional ADP facilities. 67
The Congress was presented with its first general study on the application of
ADP operations and systems analysis, entitled "Automatic Data Processing for the
Congress," in 1967.8 This study, which paved the way for the introduction of
the adaptation of automatic data processing and systems methodology for con-
61 A. D. Little Co., Inc., Management Study of the U.S. Congress, Report to N.B.C. News,
Nov. 24, 1965, at 11.
62 Supra note 4.
63 Remarks of Senator Humphrey, 110 CONG. R c. 9075 (1964).
64 H.R. 18428, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
65 Remarks of Representative McClory, 112 CONG. REc. 27824 (1966). His bill was
reintroduced in 1967 as H.R. 21, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
66 H.R. 7874, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See remarks of Representative Dow, 113
CONG. REc. H3507 (daily ed. April 4, 1967).
67 H.R. 7012, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
68 Chartrand, Automatic Data Processing for the Congress, LmRARY oF CONGRESS, LEGIs-
LATIVE REFERENCE SERvICE, MONOLITH NO. TK 6565 C (Jan. 3, 1967).
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gressional tasks, recommended the application of computer technology in these
diverse areas:
1. Maintenance of current information on the status of pending legislation;
2. Dissemination of selected priority information of especial significance to
members of Congress and their committees on the basis of profiles reflecting
specific needs;
3. Storage of appropriations statistics and information, coupled with flexible
retrieval capacity;
4. Storage and retrieval of legal literature and related information;
5. Acquisition and dissemination of up-to-date information on the activities
of committees; and
6. Maintenance of files on lobbying activities and federal contracts awards."9
Private organizations have also recently begun to explore various considera-
tions surrounding the problems of information support for the Congress. As
illustrations of this development, the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research initiated a series of studies on the functions of the Congress, in
which information requirements, including computer methodology, were
featured." Additionally, as noted, the Arthur D. Little Company prepared a
management study of the Congress. And, the Brookings Institution, the American
Enterprise Institute,"' and the Washington Operations Research Council have
sponsored seminars and other meetings to acquaint members of Congress and
their staffs with the potential applications of systems analysis."
These and other efforts began to coalesce during the 91st Congress. Under
the aegis of Representative John Brademas (D-Ind.), the House Democratic
Study caucus (and the Democratic Study Group) endorsed the following resolu-
tion:
Resolved, that the Committee on House Administration be fully supported
by Democratic members in efforts to improve the efficiency of operations
of the House of Representatives, and we urge that these efforts include, but
not be limited to, the use of computers and of a centralized mail processing
system.73
The House Administration Committee responded to this mandate by referring
the matter to its Special Subcommittee on Electrical and Mechanical Office
Equipment. Also, in the 91st Congress, Representative Jack Brooks (D-Tex.)
introduced a bill requiring the Comptroller General to, inter alia, "coordinate the
development, establishment, maintenance, and operation of data processing
69 Id. at 13-23. See also Chartrand, Information Processing for the U.S. Congress, paper
presented before the International Federation of Information Processing Congress, PROCEEDINoS
OF THE I.F.I.P. CONGRESS 68 (Booklet G) G23 (1968), and Chartrand, Computer-Oriented
Information for the U.S. Congress, 1 LAW AND COMP. TECH. 2 (1968).
70 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 56. See Dechart, supra note 56; Robin-
son, Decision Making in Congress at 259; and Janda, Information Systems for Congress at 415.
71 The formal papers and the transcript of the A.E.P. seminar were published as IL
CHARTRAND, JANDA, AND HUGO, INFORMATION SUPPORT, PROGRAM BUDGETING, AND THE
CONGRESS (1968).
72 These and related developments are discussed in greater detail in Chartrand, Computer
Technology and the Congress, 6 INPORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL 229, 232-4 (1970).
73 27 CONG. QuAR. 525 (1969).
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systems necessary for the effective and efficient fulfillment of the substantive
responsibilities of the Congress" and directing units of the Congress utilizing data
processing techniques to adhere to the Comptroller General's guidelines "to
assure optimum effectiveness and efficiency in the overall acquisition and use of
computers by the Congress." 4 The measure was reported by the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations in May of 1969,"M but was never considered by
the House.
The initiative within the Congress for utilization of relevant computer capa-
bilities was taken by the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, the
Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate, and the Congressional Research
Service. While the automated operations in the Offices of the House Clerk and
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms have principally been routine ADP 6ffice functions
(e.g., payroll, accounting, and inventory, and, in the case of the Senate, auto-
mated mailing), the C.R.S. has made the initial effort to implement meaningful
computer systems for the storage, categorization and dissemination of pertinent
legislative data.
For some time, one of the staple outputs of the C.R.S. has been the Digest
of Public General Bills, brief summaries of the legislation currently pending
before the Congress. Preparation of the Digest was significantly enhanced in
1967, when Administrative Terminal System units (special electric typewriters
used to insert information into computers) were applied to the task. Information
concerning current legislation, both synoptic and as to its status in the legislative
process, is now stored, recalled and edited by means of a network of more than
thirty computer terminals, and published by an offset reproduction method.
(Computer facilities have also been put to limited use in the preparation of leg-
islative calendars for four major House committees.) Other legislative research
items developed by C.R.S. with computer support include a Legislative Status
Report on major bills, an index to the multitude of reports and memoranda of
interest to the Congress warehoused by the Library of Congress, and the "Cur-
rent Awareness" program, by which computer printouts of subject and author
indices and summaries are made available to thirty-two congressional committees
and C.R.S. researchers according to their interests as indicated in a keyword list.
These long-overdue developments in the area of ADP adaptation for the
Congress, achieved largely through the pioneering of Robert Chartrand, are
important steps in the right direction. Yet compared to the utilization of informa-
tion devices and techniques in other fields, these advancements can clearly only
be the beginning. Faced with the "information overload" ' that already burdens
most congressmen and their staff and which is mounting ever-increasingly, the
Congress must avail itself of the sophisticated techniques now available in the
realm of computerized information systems. But the adaptation of information
technology is required not simply to enable the House and Senate to keep abreast
of the deluge of data and materials which sometimes threaten to engulf them.
More importantly, computer techniques-for the Congress are essential if that
74 See .I. 10791, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
75 H.R. REP. No. 91-258, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
76 The concept of "information overload" is discussed in A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHocK 350(1970).
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institution is to play a meaningful role in the governance of American society
tomorrow.
77
The 'Congress, on two occasions, recently came close to but shied away from
the taking of some further steps toward the development of an independent
congressional information system. During consideration in the Senate of the
proposed Legislative Reorganization Act of 1967,78 Senator Hugh Scott (R-Pa.)
introduced an amendment to provide for the establishment of a Joint Committee
on Congressional Operations, which would be responsible for "continuing study
of automatic data processing and information retrieval systems for Congress." 79
On that occasion, Senator Scott stressed that the "broad spectrum of issues facing
the Congress... can be coped with only by the utilization of all available human
and technological resources."8 Although the bill was approved by the Senate in
1968, the measure died in the House Committee on Rules.
Two years later, during consideration in the House of the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1970,81 provisions authorizing the establishment of a Joint
Committee on Data Processing, which would have had broad authority to mod-
ernize the Congress' information-gathering machinery through the use of data
processing facilities and professionals,8 2 were deleted from the House Rules Com-
mittee's bill.8 The principal argument deployed to defeat these provisions was
that the House Special Subcommittee on Electrical and Mechanical Office
Equipment was in the process of developing plans for a House computer system
and the subcommittee's then chairman, Representative Joe D. Waggoner (.D-
La.), regarded the legislation as an infringement on the committee's jurisdiction.8
Also, there was-and still is--intense disagreement within the Congress as to the
efficacy of the joint committee approach, in large part because of considerable
antipathy on the subject between the House and Senate (the Senate has organ-
ized a standing Subcommittee on Computer Services and currently leases a
computer for preparation of mailing-list printouts for individual senators).5
77 See Chartrand, Redimensioning Congressional Information Support, 11 JURIMETRICS
JOURNAL 165 (1971).
78 S. 355, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
79 Amendment No. 63, 113 CONG. REc. S2124 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1967).
80 Remarks of Senator Scott, 113 CONG. Rue. S2124 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1967).
81 See Part V, infra.
82 H.R. 17654, §§ 401-412, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), as reported by House Committee
on Rules.
83 116 CONG. REC. H8887 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1970).
84 See 116 CONG. Rec. H8880 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1970).
85 Representative Waggoner was angry because Senate Majority Leader Michael Mansfield
never responded to a letter from the then Chairman of the Committee on House Administration,
former Representative Samuel N. Friedel, inviting the Senate to join with the House in studying
the feasibility of a congressional computer system. 116 CONG. Rua. H8879 '(daily ed. Sept. 17,
1970). Noting indications that the Senate Majority Leader would only communicate with
the House Speaker or House Majority Leader, Representative Waggoner declared: "If we
cannot communicate any better than that, there is no way under God's blue canopy of heaven
that a joint committee can succeed." Id. at H8880. But Representative Robert McClory
cautioned his colleagues about making such an important decision "on the basis of pique or on
the basis of insult or something like that." Ibid. Representative B. F. Sisk, who was shepherding
the 1970 Act through the House, produced letters from Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott
and then Assistant Majority Leader Edward Kennedy, expressing interest in a joint effort. Id.
at H8880-1. Representative Sisk concluded that "if there is any validity to the study, the
effort, and the consultation that your subcommittee [House Subcommittee on Legislative Re-
organization] has gone through and has developed in the last 18 months, then we will be making
a terrible mistake if we adopt the amendment of the gentleman from Louisiana [Rep. Wag-
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Additionally, there is dissension within the House, as the various committees
involved--Government Operations, Rules, House Administration, and Ap-
propriations-jockey for ascendancy over the House's future computer program.
For example, Representative Waggoner organized a "working group" to tap the
expertise of private industry in the field"8 and, in June, 1970, negotiated con-
tracts with the Stanford Research Institute as the primary conceptual planning
contractor and eight private companies to develop an overall "system manage-
ment plan" for the House," before the House even had an opportunity to debate
the creation of the proposed Joint Committee on Data Processing. Behind these
disputes, says Andrew J. Glass, is the realization that "[a]ny group that designs
and runs a computer system in Congress also has the potential to shape the legis-
lative process.""8 As of this writing, not only is the House proceeding toward
development of a separate computer capacity, it appears that the House Com-
mittee on Administration has wrested control over computer development from
the Clerk of the House. 9
"The potential of the computer in assisting the Congressman is not un-
limited," writes Mr. Chartrand, "but there are many repetitive tasks which con-
sume unwarranted amounts of member and staff time which might be better
performed through ADP techniques.""0 While it is reassuring to know that there
are those on Capitol Hill who recognize the need for software programming and
a well-stocked information storage system for the legislative branch, it must be
recognized that the Congress-institutionally-has by no means espoused the
concepts of today's information technology.
Despite the absolute necessity of an up-to-date ADP system for the Congress,
however, the closing of the information gap cannot be accomplished by computer
technology alone. Recently, the Congress has shown some signs of increased self-
assertion in the area of domestic policymaking, by means of access to more cur-
rent and reliable information, as part of a larger effort to re-establish the Congress
as a coequal branch of today's national government.
The Congress is currently facing many problems-informational and other-
wise--created by the social, political, and economic side effects of technology.
Among the congressional responses to the racing tides of unrestrained technology
has been preparation in the House of legislation to establish an Office of Tech-
nology Assessment for the Congress as an aid in the identification and considera-
goner]." Id. at H8880. Many members believed the House had progressed too far on its own
in this regard to allow the Senate to join in a combined arrangement to begin studies anew,
thus setting the House effort back by months. Asserted Representative Wayne Hays: "I think
the Waggoner amendment is the answer. We [the House] are ready to go. We are on the
threshold, and I do not want to see us back up." Id. at H8886. The Senate, nonetheless,
continues to make limited progress in the computer field. See S. Res. 184, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), authorizing funds to improve through the use of computers the Senate payroll and
personnel system, which passed the Senate on October 21, 1971. 117 CONG. REc. S16725
(daily ed.).
86 See Schloss, Congress Needs Computers-But They're Many Years Away, 2 GOVERN-
MENT ExEcuTrrs 42 (1970).
87 See remarks of Representative Waggoner, 116 CONG. REc. H8880 (daily ed. Sept. 17,
1970).
88 Center for Political Research Report, Congress Moves into Computer Age but Divides
on Control of New Systems, in 2 NATIONAL JOURNAL 1150 (1970).
89 See note 401, infra.
90 Chartrand, supra note 72, at 231.
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tion of existing and probable impacts of the applications of technology, and to
extend the congressional information-gathering function in this area.9 Another
proposal under consideration, in the Senate, is the proposed Full Opportunity and
National Goals and Priorities Act, designed to provide the Congress with tools
for long-range domestic planning and legislating.92 This would establish within
the Congress an Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis, which would be author-
ized to conduct a continuing analysis of national goals and priorities, and would
furnish the Congress with the information, data, and analysis necessary for "en-
lightened priority decisions.19 3 These and similar efforts symbolize a renewed
interest in the Congress in enhancement of congressional information-processing
capabilities.
The Congress has also been active in recent years on a number of fronts
in efforts to bridge the information gap by attempting to equalize the availability
of current and material information as between the executive and legislative
branches. This aspect of executive-legislative relationships has long been the fount
of much-and often bitter-controversy, as illustrated by the conflicts between
the branches generated by Senator Joseph McCarthy's investigations of the
Department of the Army and the firing of former Department of State security
officer Otto F. Otepka for giving secret personnel documents to the Senate Sub-
committee on Internal Security.
A point of high drama in this regard was recently reached when, on July 28,
1971, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously voted to suspend
all funds for the entire U.S. military assistance program unless certain information
the Committee had been seeking from the Department of Defense was provided
or until the President furnished a reason for denying the request. In retaliation,
the President, on August 5, 1971, invoked the doctrine of executive privilege
(thereby concluding the suspension of the funds), directing the Secretaries of
Defense and State not to make the information available to the Congress on the
ground that the public interest would not be served by doing so.
This dispute began in 1969, when the Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Senator J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), requested from the
Department of Defense its "formal Five-Year Plan for the Military Assistance
Program"94 to assist the Committee in appraising the executive branch's legislative
requests for authorization of military aid. At first, Secretary of Defense Melvin
R. Laird (formerly a member of Congress) refused, for the reasons that "in the
past copies have not been made available to the GAO, or to the Chairman, Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives," and because the "entire
Five Year Plan was not made available.., because it is regarded as a staff study,
an entirely tentative planning document at the staff level."9 5 Secretary Laird
attached to his letter of refusal a description of the nature of the five-year plan
in question.99 Chairman Fulbright responded (18 months later) with the asser-
91 See text accompanying notes 291-309, infra.
92 See text accompanying notes 310-326, infra.
93 S. 5, § 201, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See text accompanying notes 315-325, in/ra.
94 Letter of Senator Fulbright to Secretary Laird, dated May 21. 1969, at 117 CONG. R c.
S14119 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1971).
95 Letter of Secretary Laird to Senator Fulbright, dated June 26, 1969, ibid.
96 Id. at S14120.
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tion that "[i]t will be impossible for the Committee to arrive at realistic estimates
of the long-range cost of the military aid program unless it has access to these
materials,"'" citing the requirement of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970 that each report of a Senate committee include an estimate of the cost
which would be incurred in carrying out the accompanying bill's program in the
current and succeeding five fiscal years. s Following other (apparently unan-
swered) letters,99 Senator Fulbright notified Secretary Laird of his Committee's
vote to render funds for the military assistance program unavailable for further
obligation or expenditure." 0 (The Senate Foreign Relations Committee acted
under authority of a provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which
provides that foreign assistance funds shall be terminated for any activity thirty-
five days after the Committee requests a document relating to the foreign assis-
tance program, unless the document is provided or the President certifies that he
has forbidden that it be furnished and gives his reasons for the refusal. 1 1 )
Secretary Laird responded to the Foreign Relations Committee's action by
stating that, since, "to the best of our knowledge, there is no such thing as a
current Five-Year Plan for the Military Assistance Program," the funds cutoff
provision of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act is inapplicable." 2 The Secretary, less
than a month later, forwarded to Senator Fulbright a memorandum from the
President, instructing the Secretaries of Defense and State "not to make available
[to the Congress] any information and material which would impair the orderly
function of the Executive Branch of the Government" and, specifically, not to
provide the legislative branch with "any internal working documents which would
disclose tentative planning data on future years of the military assistance program
which are not approved Executive Branch positions." ' Aside from the tantaliz-
ing question as to whether such a five-year plan actually exists, this episode illus-
trates the imbalance of power between the legislative and executive branches per-
petuated by the imbalance of information resources. Thus, in the aftermath
of this affair, Chairman Fulbright stated that the unwillingness of the executive
branch to provide the requested materials, "even on a confidential basis, makes
it most difficult to legislate in the area of foreign military assistance"; as to
whether the Senate can develop sufficient information with its own resources to
provide an adequate basis for objectively reviewing the military assistance
97 Letter of Senator Fulbright to Secretary Laird, dated Feb. 26, 1971, ibid.
98 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 § 252(a) (i) (A); see note 218, infra.
99 See supra note 94, at S14120-1.
100 Letter of Senator Fulbright to Secretary Laird, dated July 28, 1971, id. at S14121.
101 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 634(c), 75 Stat. 424, 455 (1961).
102 Letter of Secretary Laird to Senator Fulbright, dated Aug. 5, 1971, supra note 94, at
S14121-2.
103 Letter of Secretary Laird to Senator Fulbright, dated Aug. 31, 1971, supra note 94, at
S14122. It should be noted that the President, by letter dated April 7, 1969, to Representa-
tive John E. Moss (D-Cal.), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and
Government Information, said that "this Administration is dedicated to insuring a free flow of
information to the Congress and the news media-and, thus, to the citizens" and that "the
scope of executive privilege must be very narrowly construed." Id. at S14121. The President's
memorandum for the heads of executive departments and agencies, dated March 24, 1969,
establishing a procedure to govern compliance with congressional demands for information,
appears at ibid.
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program, Senator Fulbright indicated the answer would have to await actual
examination of the President's foreign aid proposals. ° '
The Southeast Asian experience has severely undermined the relative harmony
that generally prevailed between the executive and legislative branches in the
field of foreign affairs. Thus, only a few years ago, one commentator stated that
"[i]t is probable that the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs
Committees have better working relationships with the executive branch than
with other committees."1 5 Today, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution has been re-
pealed and Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Fulbright has introduced
legislation which would require a signed statement by the President before an
employee of the executive branch could assert executive privileges as to testimony
or documents sought by the Congress.' Other such examples are plentiful,
typified perhaps by Representative Bella Abzug's resolution "requesting the
Secretary of State to furnish the text of all communications pertaining to the
forthcoming [October, 1971] Vietnamese presidential election.' 0 7
Recent congressional interest in reasserting its claim to material information
has not been manifested only with respect to foreign developments. Members of
Congress are increasingly displaying a realization that the Congress must likewise
provide itself with the means for analyzing and evaluating government programs
and proposals on the domestic front, to adequately perform oversight functions,
establish budget priorities, and the like. To this end, for example, Representative
Joseph P. Addabbo (D-N.Y.) has proposed the creation of a Joint Committee on
Classified Information, to combat the use of security classifications within the
federal government "as a means for suppressing information on governmental
affairs about which the public does have a right to know."'0 8 This joint com-
mittee would investigate the practices in the executive branch used to classify
information and "suspected uses of such classification procedures within the ex-
ecutive branch for purposes contrary to the public welfare," and would be
empowered to "publicly disclose any classified information the classification of
which the joint committee considers not to be merited in the interests of the
common defense and security and the disclosure of which the joint committee
considers to be in the public interest."'0 5 Another resolution, this on a broader
scale, sponsored by Representative Silvio 0. Conte (R-Mass.), would establish
a Joint Select Committee on Government Program Analysis and Evaluation, to
ascertain how the Congress can best develop the means of "scientifically evaluat-
ing programs and activities.""' The Conte committee would be assigned the
duties of determining what methods, procedures, or proposals would "result in the
104 See statement of Senator Fulbright, dated Aug. 31, 1971, supra note 94, at S14124.
Subsequently, Secretary of State William P. Rogers supplied the Foreign Relations Committee
with a tentative five-year projection of foreign aid outlays.
105 Rogow and Temple, Congressional Government: Legislative Power v. Democratic
Processes, 32 Gno. WASH. L. Rev. 947'(1964).
106 S. 1125, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The Senate Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers concluded hearings on this bill on Aug. 5, 1971, and approved the measure for consid-
eration by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on October 28, 1971.
107 H.R. Res. 595, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reported on September 27, 1971. H.R.
REP. No. 92-512.
108 H.R.J. Res. 745, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
109 Id. § 3.
110 H.R. Con. Res. 13, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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most proper and beneficial evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of
Federal programs and activities by objective, scientific, and empirical analysis and
in the most practical, expeditious, efficient, and effective manner.""' While
these and like proposals show little indication of coming to immediate fruition,
they are evidence of a growing ferment in the Congress in reaction to its informa-
tional inadequacies.
Clearly, what the Congress desperately needs are independent sources of
information qualitatively equivalent to that enjoyed by the President. It would
be preposterous, of course, to argue for another vast bureaucracy paralleling that
which largely serves the executive.'12 But the means are available-ranging from
the application of contemporary data processing techniques to redressing an
inequity in the Internal Revenue Code-to enable the Congress to have readily
accessible separate inputs of information, against which it could test out the in-
formation supplied by the executive and with which it could independently arrive
at meaningful conclusions and make important policy decisions"
The improvements implemented by the Legislative Reorganization Acts of
1946 and 1970 only begin to provide the Congress with the competency required
to legislate effectively in the twentieth century. This minimum enhancement of
the Congress' information-handling capacities has been achieved largely by the
enactment of items which should have been instituted years beforehand and
constitutes a foundation on which the Congress must build. As discussed, the
Congress must do more than simply avail itself of up-to-date information tech-
nology. To fully strengthen its information resources, it is essential that the
Congress make provision for the utilization of all reasonable techniques for the
acquisition and processing of the hard information necessary for legislating in the
face of problems of unprecedented severity and complexity.
V. Congressional Reform: The Historical Context
The information gap which so often stymies the Congress in its efforts to leg-
islate effectively is, of course, only one aspect of the necessity of congressional
reform. To fully appreciate the need for revamping the Congress, the general
perpetuation of the status quo which has largely characterized the organiza-
tion and procedures of the Congress must be contrasted with the wide-ranging
developments of past decades which have drastically and repeatedly reshaped
American society.
From the settlement of the original colonies in the early 1600's and the
American revolution against the England of King George III, through the strug-
gles over the Constitution and the transformations of Jacksonian Democracy, on-
ward past the Civil War, the rise of industrialism and the United States to world
power, two World Wars, and the Great Depression, continuing with the impact
111 Id. § 3.
112 It is noted without comment that the bureaucracy can subvert a President's program as
well. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER AND A. DE- GRAZIA, supra note 13, at 94-6.
113 See Part VII, infra. See also the proposed Truth in Government Act of 1971, S. 2965,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); remarks of Senator Muskie, 117 CONG. REC. S20748 (daily ed.
Dec. 7, 1971).
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of the New Deal and the Cold War, to the Vietnam involvement, the exploration
of space, and the perils of the atomic age, the history of the United States is a
panorama of sweeping change. The nation has evolved from an agrarian country
to an industrialized state, from a colonial outpost to a major international power,
and from an experiment in government to the oldest functioning democratic
republic. Social, economic, and political institutions have been born, thrived,
and either been transfigured, abandoned or disregarded during the lifetime of
the United States.
Within the twentieth century, spectacular scientific, technological and socio-
economic developments have occurred in the United States, shaping international
events, domestic policies, and individual values. While modem man grapples
with these myriad developments, it appears that the rate of change in social
processes is rapidly accelerating, thereby increasing the pace of contemporary
problems and concerns tumbling before decision-makers in and out of govern-
ment."4 Against this brief backdrop of an ever-changing society, the United
States Congress has basically persisted as a static-in terms of organization-
institution.
From the opening days of the Congress in the spring of 1789 until the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,"' there was no major reform of the
processes of lawmaking as practiced by the national legislature of the United
States. Throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth
century, the Congress' institutional operations were conducted largely in ad-
herence to the blueprint drawn by the first Congresses.
The principal task facing the membership of the initial Congresses in the
closing decade of the eighteenth century was establishment of the structure of the
government of the United States, that is, to implement the newly adopted Con-
stitution. The First Congress instituted the offices of the House and Senate,
developed some rudimentary standing rules, and began journals of the proceed-
ings of each house. The early days of congressional proceedings saw the Congress
decide to initiate legislation by means of committees." 8 In 1880, the Congress,
to enhance its information resources, established the Library of Congress."' These
two decisions, to generate legislation through the committee framework and to
have a legislative library, stand as the chief decisions of the Congress as respects
legislative procedures until the mid-twentieth century.
Most of the "reforms" of the Congress occasioned during the initial decades
of its existence were not so much revisions of procedure but were institutional
reconstitutions of the legislative branch reflecting changes in the internal dis-
tribution of political strengths. This was because the Congress was immediately
dominated by the party system of legislative government, first the Federalist,
then the Whig and Know-Nothing parties, and eventually the Democratic and
Republican parties. The upheavals in the Congress of consequence were caused
by shifting concepts of the extent of party domination of the legislative process.
Leadership struggles dominated the evolution of the Congress into its present
114 This is one of the central themes of FUTURE SHOOcK, supra note 76.
115 60 Stat. 812, 28 U.S.C. § 921-946.
116 G. GALLOWAY, HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 64 (1962).
117 See 2 U.S.C. ch. 5.
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form, A highlight of the development of the Congress in this regard was the
House revolt against Speaker Joseph G. Cannon in 1910, which diminished the
Speaker's authority in relation to the chairmen of the standing committees and
built the House Committee on Rules into an independent center of power. 8
Similarly, Speaker Sam Rayburn, in an effort to reduce the Rules Committee's
expected hostility to the legislative program of newly elected President John F.
Kennedy, won a battle in 1961 to enlarge the committee by three members, in
an attempt to coalesce a different informal working majority in favor of the
"national" Democrats." 9  From the party structure of the Congress has sprung
the transfer of leadership from House and Senate officers to committee chair-
men, the high degree of independence and specialization among committees,
and the seniority system.
There were, of course, instances of congressional "reform" prior to 1946
other than through the politics of power distribution within the Congress. The
seventeenth amendment to the Constitution, by which senators were subjected
to direct popular vote (until then they were chosen by state legislatures), was
adopted in 1913, and the twentieth amendment to the Constitution was adopted
in 1933, thereby abolishing "lame duck"'"2 Congresses by providing that new
sessions should commence on the third day of January following the elections. 2'
Notable instances of statutory "reform" include fixing the size of the House at
435 members in 1912,122 establishment of the Legislative Reference Service (now
the Congressional Research Service) in 1914,123 creation of the bill-drafting Office
of Legislative Counsel in 1919,'" and the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
which established the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management
and Budget, and the General Accounting Office as an agency of the Congress . 2 5
Also, the Reorganization Act of 1939,121 while not an illustration of congressional
"reform," had an impact on congressional operations by instituting the concept
of the presidential "reorganization plan" which led, inter alia, to the establish-
ment of the Executive Office of the President. Nonetheless, while these develop-
ments - the constitutional amendments and the various enactments - intro-
118 See HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIES 95, H.R. Doc. No.
250, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
119 See Peabody, The Enlarged Rules Committee, in R. PEABODY AND N. POLSBY, NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 129 '(1963).
120 See W. SAFIRE, THE NEW LANGUAGE OF POLITICS 226 (1968). For an analysis of the
"lame ducks" in the 91st Congress see U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 23, 1970, at 20.
121 The U. S. Constitution originally provided (art. I § 4) that "The Congress shall
assemble at least once in every year ... on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by
law appoint a different day." The first session of the First Congress convened in March, 1789,
pursuant to a resolution of the Continental Congress (although the House first achieved a
quorum on April 1, 1789, and the Senate actually became organized on April 6, 1789). Up to
and including May 20, 1820, eighteen acts were passed providing for the meeting of Congress
on other days. Since 1820, the Congress met regularly on the first Monday in December, until
January, 1934, when the twentieth amendment became effective. See infra note 451.
122 37 Stat. 1723 (1912), 2 U.S.C. § 2.
123 The L.R.S. was initially established as a division of the Library of Congress. See Kravitz,
The Congressional Research Service and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MONOLITH NO. JF 522 (Jan. 8, 1971).
The L.R.S. received statutory authority and status as a Department of the Library of Congress
under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 § 203, 2 U.S.C. 166.
124 40 Stat. 1141, § 1303 (1919).
125 42 Stat. 20 (1921).
126 53 Stat. 561 (1939).
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duced meaningful and useful enhancements of congressional functions, they fall
far short of constituting substantive congressional reform.
Thus, the Congress waited 156 years to undertake a comprehensive review
and revision of its procedures and methods of operation. Despite momentous
socioeconomic and technological changes in the society it was designed to serve,
not until passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 did the Congress
seek to modernize itself. Yet once the Congress finally decided to reform its
procedures, it approved a significant bill. As the late George B. Galloway, who
was director of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Reorganization of
Congress which produced the 1946 Act, wrote, the reform act of that year "added
up to the most sweeping changes in the machinery and facilities of Congress ever
adopted in a single package."12
The thrust of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was to streamline
and simplify the congressional committee structure. 2 Probably the principal
single accomplishment of the 1946 Act was the reduction in the number of stand-
ing committees from 33 to 15 in the Senate and from 48 to 19 in the House.
In addition, this Act augmented professional staff assistance for congressmen,
strengthened the Legislative Reference Service in the Library of Congress, im-
plemented regulation of lobbying activities, directed standing committees to con-
tinually exercise the function of oversight of administration, and increased the
compensation of members of Congress. Still other objectives, as enumerated by
Dr. Galloway, include clarification of committee duties and reduction of juris-
dictional disputes,, regularization and publicizing of committee procedures, reduc-
tion of the congressional workload, and reinforcement of the power of the
purse." 9 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 junked much of the Con-
gress' antiquated machinery and introduced many long-overdue improvements
in congressional operations.
However, procedures for a continuous, formal review and study of means
by which the Congress might be improved were not instituted in 1946, and, al-
though the Senate Committee on Government Operations recommended im-
provements in the 1946 Act in 1948 and 1951, another 25 years were to pass
before a package of further reforms was implemented. In the interim, some
single congressional "reforms" were made, such as in 1968, when the House
established a Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.2 ' Also, the ground-
work was being laid for much of what was to become the Legislative Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1970."'
Early in the 88th Congress (1963), former Senator Joseph S. Clark (D-Pa.)
127 G. GALLOWAY, supra note 7, at 646.
128 Justice Harold H. Burton once observed that "the overwhelming purpose of Congress
[in enacting the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946] was to make changes of procedure
which would enable it to devote more time to major public issues." United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 549-550 '(1951).
129 For a full description of the accomplishments and omissions of the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1946, see GALLOWAY, supra note 7, ch. 23; see also Shull, The Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946, 20 TEmP. L.Q. 375 (1947).
130 For an analysis of some congressional "reforms" since the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946 see Sittig, The United States Congress and Internal Reform, 20 VAmx. L. R.v. 61
(1966-7).
131 See text accompanying notes 142-9, infra.
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-and Senator Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) sponsored a resolution to establish a
committee to study congressional operations.'"' However, the Senate Committee
on Rules, in reporting the resolution to the Senate, limited the measure so as
to remove from the study committee's jurisdiction any authority to propose
alteration of the rules, precedents, or floor procedures of either House. 3 Con-
troversy over the restricted resolution precluded any substantive progress toward
the creation of a committee on congressional organization.
The 89th Congress, in 1965, established a Joint Committee on the Or-
ganization of Congress, to study the organization and operation of the Congress
and to recommend improvements. 34 Chaired by former Senator A.S. Mike
Monroney (who, with the late Robert LaFollette, was also co-architect of the
1946 reorganization act) and Representative Ray J. Madden (D-Ind.), the
Joint Committee took the testimony of 76 senators and representatives and re-
ceived written statements from another 30. -The views of 123 public witnesses
were also heard and a fifteen-volume hearing record was built. After weeks of
executive sessions, the Joint Committee filed its report in July, 1966,' and a
Special Senate Committee on the Organization of Congress was formed to draft
legislation. Although a comprehensive measure was readied late in the 89th
Congress, the legislation was deferred until the beginning of the 90th Congress.
Following 18 days of debate, 31 roll-call votes, and the adoption of 40
amendments, the Senate passed the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1967.36
on March 7, 1967, by a vote of 75 to 9. The controversial bill languished in
the House Committee on Rules for the duration of the 90th Congress, while
undergoing several but futile revisions, 3 ' and there died at the expiration of
that Congress in October, 1968.381 Among the various attempts to secure ac-
tion on the reorganization measure during the 90th Congress was a House sit-in
in September, 1968, a 32-hour continuous session generated by a coalition of
Republican representatives led by then-Representative Donald Rumsfeld
("Rumsfeld's Raiders") in an unsuccessful effort to force the leadership tQ
bring the bill to the House floor. 39
In the 91st Congress, the Senate Committee on Government Operations,
on May 23, 1969, reported 40 the Senate's successor to the 1967 bill.' 4' Earlier,
in April, 1969, the House Special Subcommittee on Legislative Reorganization
was established, 42 under the chairmanship of Representative B.F. Sisk (D-Cal.).
The House Subcommittee, having studied the Senate-passed measure and other
legislation, 43 produced a committee print bill in November, 1969, which was the
132 S. Con. Res. 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
133 S. RzP. No. 504, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
134 S. Con. Res. 2. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
135 S. REP. No. 1414, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
136 S. 355, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
137 See H.R. 10748, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), H.R. 18039, H.R. 15687, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968).
138 See Hopkins, Congressional Reform: The Clash With Tradition, 54 A.B.A.J. 80 (1968).
139 See 114 CONG. REc. 30090-30103, 30209-30221 (1968).
140 S. Rlp. No. 91-202, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
141 S. 844, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
142 See H.R. REPX. No. 91-1215, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), at 2.
143 See H.R. 2185, H.R. 2186, H.R. 2187, H.R. 6278, H.R. 10426, and H.R. 11475, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1969).
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basis for eight days of open hearings and, subsequently, nearly a year of execu-
tive sessions. In May,1970, the Subcommittee presented its recommendations
to the parent House Committee on Rules, 4' which reported14 5 the legislation
on June 17, 1970.
After the longest House debate on any single measure in three decades
(eleven days), the House passed the bill, by a vote of 326 to 19, in September,
1970."' The Senate debated the bill for two days and passed the measure by
a vote of 59 to 5, on October 6, 1970.' The House agreed to the Senate amend-
ments on October 8, 1970,14 and President Nixon signed the reorganization
act into law on October 26, 1970."49
Thus it is that the history of congressional reform lacks little parallel to the
history of the larger society. The Congress oftentimes seemes immune"0 or
even defiant to change and tends to cling, weighted by inertia, to outworn tradi-
tions and outdated procedures. Recent years have shown a greater inclination
in the Congress toward procedural and organizational reform, as evidenced by
the Legislative Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970. But if the past is indeed
only prologue, then history's message is that future Congresses will have many
societal changes with which to cope. The Congress no longer has the luxury
of waiting 150 years or even 25 years before modernizing its practices.
VI. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970
Nearly a quarter of a century after passage of the 1946 Reform Act, the
Congress approved another omnibus congressional reorganization measure, the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.' However, the 1970 Act, which
generally became effective with the convening of the 92nd Congress, while a
modest package of improvements in congressional operations, is not the per-
vasive reform measure that characterizes its 1946 predecessor. Nonetheless, the
1970 Reorganization Act has some important features, and points the Congress
in some right directions toward improvements in its oversight function and
modernization of its information-processing systems.'52 Then, too, in the face
of widespread national disinterest in modernizing the Congress, the general pub-
lic probably received more "congressional reform" than was warranted, as the
nation continues to display more apathy toward than empathy for an improved
144 H.R. 17654, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
145 H.R. REP. No. 91-1215, supra note 142. The House Rules Committee, on June 11, 1970,
reported (H.R. REP. No. 91-1186) a resolution (H.R. Res. 1031, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970))
assigning jurisdiction over lobbying and campaign expenditure measures affecting the House to
the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, which passed the House on July 8,
1970.
146 116 CONG. REc. H8897 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1970).
147 116 CONG. REc. S17181 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970).
148 116 CONo. REc. H9891 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1970).
149 Pub. L. No. 91-510, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 84 Stat. 1140 (1970).
150 See Nutting, Federal Legislation Through Fifty Years, 29 FED. B.J. 255 (1970).
151 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-510), 84 Stat. 1140 '(1970).
152 See generally Hopkins, Congressional Reform: A Little, but Possible, Bit, 57 A.B.A.J. 62
(1971). See also Kravitz, The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, LmRA OF CONGRESS,
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, MONOLITH NO. JK 1000 F (Nov. 18, 1970). Some of the
items contained in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 are not discussed in this part but
in an appropriate context elsewhere in the article.
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Congress. Wrote veteran Capitol Hill reporter Richard L. Lyons, "[p]assage
of the congressional reform bill . . . was something of a marvel, if simply for
the fact that a bill labeled reform was passed.""'
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 fails to address many aspects
of congressional reform, although the occasions of its consideration in committee
and on the floor in both houses gave opportunity for discussion of nearly the
entire gamut of the subject. During the course of the debates, especially in the
House, numerous amendments were offered and analyzed (and some approved),
many of considerable significance. Some of the proposals unsuccessfully ad-
vanced during the amending processes in the House and Senate with respect
to the 1970 Act are presently under varying stages of study, and merit serious
consideration.
Committee Procedures and Structures
The 1970 Reorganization Act introduced some progressive modifications
in the operating procedures of the House and Senate standing committees
(except Senate Appropriations and, in certain instances, House Rules and
other House committees). House committees are now authorized to permit the
telecasting of public hearings (House committees traditionally have not permit-
ted televising of hearings; Senate committee hearings can be telecast under pre-
viously adopted rules..) when the committee votes for coverage, subpoenaed
witnesses approve, there is no commercial sponsorship, and other conditions. 55
Subject to these criteria, radio broadcasting and still photography are also permis-
sible." These methods of committee coverage must be in conformance with
"acceptable standards of dignity, propriety, and decorum," and be a means for
the "education, enlightenment, and information of the general public" regarding
the procedures and work of the House, as well as for the "development of the
perspective and understanding of the general public with respect to the role
and function of the House under the Constitution of the United States as an
organ of the Federal government." 15
The Act instituted an improved method whereby Senate and House com-
mittee members can initiate special meetings of their committee. Under this
procedure, three committee members can inform the committee chairman in
writing of their desire to have a meeting; should the chairman fail to schedule
the meeting within three days afterwards, to be held within seven days of the
request, a majority of the committee members can call the meeting. 58 The
Act requires standing committees to fix their regular meeting days and clarifies
the prerogative of the ranking majority party member of the committee to
preside over any regular, additional, or special meeting in the absence of the
committee chairman.' 9 A proposal rejected on the House floor would have
153 Wash. Post, Oct. 12, 1970,,at A14.
154 See 2 U.S.C. § 190a-l(b).
155 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 116(b).
156 Ibild.
157 Ibid. (RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RULE XI, clause 33 (a)).
- 158 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 102(a) and (b).
159 Ibid.
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provided for the designation of a temporary standing committee chairman when
the majority of the committee determines that the chairman is unable to discharge
his responsibilities.16 °
House and Senate committees must now make public announcements of the
date, place, and subject matter of any hearing at least one week in advance,
unless there is "good cause" to begin a hearing at an earlier date.1 1 During
the course of committee hearings in the House and Senate, committee mem-
bers in the minority party are now entitled to have at least one day to call wit-
nesses of their selection to testify with respect to the matter under considera-
tion.1 62  Each committee of the House and Senate now must require witnesses
to file a written statement of their proposed testimony in advance, unless not
practicable, and, in the Senate, the committee staff can be requested to prepare
a digest of such written statements in advance of the hearing' 6 3
The new rules require a public listing of House members' record votes in
committee on all measures, amendments, and procedural motions,6 4 and each
House committee report must now state the votes cast on the motion to report
the related bill or resolution. 5  Senate committee reports must now reflect all
roll-call votes on any measure or amendment. 6 6 Blanket proxy voting in the
House committees has been eliminated, although proxy voting on specific matters
is still permitted, 67 while senators are able to vote in committee by proxy upon
affirmative request and if the committee rules permit. 6 ' Most House commit-
tees are unable to meet, without special leave, while the House is in session dur-
ing the period in which measures are being considered for amendment, although
any committee can sit during general debate without permission. 6 ' In a move
which may weaken the filibuster as a tactic for obstruction of business,' the
Senate voted to allow its standing committees to meet while the Senate is in
session where consent therefor has been obtained from the majority and minor-
ity leadership. 1'
Three working days are now allowed for the submission of minority or.
additional views by House and Senate committee members on bills reported from
their committees,'72 and another three-day interim (with exceptions) for all mem-
bers for study between the time most committee reports become available and
the accompanying bills are called up for consideration.' Where hearings have
160 See 116 CONG. REC. H6663, H6668 (daily ed. July 14, 1970).
161 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 111 (excepting Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations and House Committee on Rules).
162 Id. § 114 (excepting Senate Committee on Appropriations).
163 Id. § 114 (excepting Senate Committee on Appropriations).
164 Id. § 104'(b).
165 Ibid.
166 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 104(a).
167 Id. § 106(b).
168 Id. § 106(a). See also id. § 243.
169 Id. § 117(b) (excepting House Committees on Appropriations, Government Operations,
Internal Security, Rules, and Standards of Official Conduct).
170 See text accompanying notes 280-90, infra.
171 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 117(a) (excepting Senate
Committee on Appropriations).
172 Id. § 107 (excepting House Committee on Rules).
173 Id. § 108(a) and (b) (excepting House Committees on Appropriations, House Admin-
istration, Rules, and Standards of Official Conduct).
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been held on the reported measure, House and Senate committees must make
"every reasonable effort" to distribute the transcripts thereof prior to considera-
tion."7 4 Also, no general appropriation bill may be considered in the House
until the printed committee hearings and the committee report thereon have
been available to House members for at least three working days."' A majority
of a House or Senate committee's membership is now empowered to force the
filing of an approved committee report (where the chairman refuses to do so)
within seven working days of its approval. 6 The Speaker was given discretion-
ary authority to recognize any committee member for the purpose of considera-
tion of a bill before the full House, where the committee has authorized the
member to act and where the measure has been made in order for debate.'"
House and Senate standing committee business meetings are now to be
open to the public unless, in the case of the House, a committee majority deter-
mines otherwise 78 or, in the Senate's case, when the committee meets for a mark-
ing-up session."'h A proposal requiring an open session vote by House commit-
tee members to determine on a day-to-day basis whether the meeting would
be open was rejected on the House floor,' largely at the insistence of committee
chairmen. House committee hearings are to be open, unless a majority of the
committee determines otherwise,' and Senate committee hearings are to be
open, unless matters of national security, the reputation of a witness, or other
confidential matters are involved.8 2 The Act also requires the House Com-
mittee on Appropriations, which usually conducts only closed hearings, to hold
open hearings at the outset of each annual session (unless national security mat-
ters are involved) to receive an overall review of the proposed federal budget
from officials of the executive branch.8 3 Hearings conducted by the Senate
Committee on Appropriations are to be open to the public, unless national security
or the reputation of a witness is involved, or other confidential matters may be
divulged.' 4
- The Senate voted to make some changes in its standing committee structure,
as discussed infra."8 5 (The House was forbidden by the rule governing consider-
ation of the 1970 reform bill to alter the jurisdiction of its standing commit-
tees.') The 1970 Act also limits to two the number of major committees on
which any senator can prospectively serve,8 7 with senators prohibited from
174 Ibid.
175 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 108(c).
176 Id. § 105 '(excepting House Committee on Rules).
177 Id. § 109.
178 Id. § 103(b).
179 Id. § 103(a).
180 116 CONG. Rac. H6671, 116681 (daily ed. July 14, 1970).
181 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 112(b).
182 Id. § 112(a) (excepting Senate Committee on Appropriations).
183 Id. § 242(c)(1).
184 Id. § 242(a).
185 See text accompanying notes 350-1, infra.
186 H.R. Res. 1093, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
187 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 132(d). Rule XXV,
clause 6(e), of the STANDING RULES O THE SENATE, now provides that no senator may serve
at any time on more than one of the following Senate committees: Appropriations, Armed
Services, Finance, or Foreign Relations. STANDING RULES O THE SENATE, 92nd Cong., appear
as SEN. Doe. No. 92-1, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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concurrently being chairman of a principal legislative committee and a joint
committee, or simultaneously heading two subcommittees of the same major com-
mittee....
House Floor Procedure
The procedures relating to consideration of measures on the floor of the
House have been modified somewhat under the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1970.
Nongermane amendments attached to House bills by the Senate now must,
on demand of any House member, be agreed to by a separate majority vote after
forty minutes of debate to survive."' The House's rules were changed to permit
the installation of electronic voting, should the House decide to do so. 9  Quo-
rum calls can now be taken by having House members sign tally sheets rather
than by the previous practice of oral answer and can be dispensed with on
achievement of a quorum, although other members would have thirty minutes
thereafter to record their presence on a tally sheet. 9 Two House parliamentary
procedures are now subject to a minimum of ten minutes of debate prior to a
vote on their adoption: amendments printed in advance in the Congressional
Record9' and motions to recommit a bill to committee with instructions to
modify its language.' 93
Probably the most significant amendment relating to the legislative pro-
cedure of the House adopted during debate on the 1970 Act (and nearly the
only provision of the measure to generate any notable public interest) was the
proposal-sponsored by 182 members-to record House members' names on
teller votes, either by House tally clerks or electronic equipment, with publication
of the voting in the Congressional Record as has been done with roll-call votes.'9
Under the prior procedure, dating back to early British parliamentary practice,
only the total votes on each side of a teller vote, which takes place in the Com-
mittee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, were published. Since
any amendment defeated while the House sits in Committee of the Whole can-
not be the subject of a later record vote when the Committee rises, members could
vote anonymously to defeat an amendment they might feel obligated to support
if their position were to be made public. Most amendments to legislation adopt-
ed in the House are decided by voice, standing, or teller votes, all-until the
1970 act-unrecorded. With recordation of teller votes, the number of mem-
bers voting and thus participating in the amending process has been increased,
and the outcome of the vote occasionally changed.'95
House conferees are now prohibited from inserting language into committee
188 Id. § 132(d).
189 Id. . 126(a).
190 Id. § 121 (a). See text accompanying notes 397-402, infra.
191 Id. § 122(a).
192 Id. § 119.
193 Id. § 123.
194 Id. § 120. For a description of the operation of this new rule see 117 CONG. Rac.
H881 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1971).
195 See text accompanying notes 33-4, supra.
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reports presenting a "specific additional topic, question, issue, or proposition"
not committed to the conference committee by either the House or Senate, and
are specifically required to reach agreement only within the scope of the specific
issues being reconciled. 9 Conference reports and accompanying explanatory
statements are now printed in the Congressional Record at least three working
days prior to their consideration in the House (except near the close of a ses-
sion),'" to enable members and their staff to study them prior to the final vote.
Information and Fiscal Controls for the Congress
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 also represents an attempt to
improve the means by which the Congress obtains and utilizes information.
The Legislative Reference Service in the Library of Congress was redes-
ignated the Congressional Research Service" 8 and converted into a more exten-
sive research center. The C.R.S. is now expected to provide various research
and analytical services for congressional committees, including a listing at the
beginning of each Congress of the programs and activities scheduled to terminate
during that Congress,' a99 nd of subjects and policy areas which committees "might
profitably analyze in depth. ' 20 0  The C.R.S. is to be staffed by specialists in at
least twenty-two broad fields (and such other fields as the Director of the C.R.S.
may consider appropriate) who will be available to members of Congress for
"special work." ''
The Comptroller General is now required by law to, at the request of any
House or Senate committee, explain to or discuss with any such committee any
report of the General Accounting Office which would assist the committee in
connection with its consideration of proposed legislation or its review of federal
programs and activities. 2 The Comptroller General is further required to pre-
pare, monthly and annually, a cumulative list of all GAO reports, and transmit
a copy of such list to each House and Senate committee, all joint committees, and
each member of the House and Senate.20 3
At various stages along the legislative process, the bill which became the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970204 contained two significant items to up-
grade congressional information-handling systems-both of which were ultimate-
ly defeated. In one instance, the House Rules Committee bill originally con-
tained provisions authorizing the creation of a Joint Committee on Data Process-
ing, which would have had broad authority to modernize the Congress' informa-
tion-processing machinery through the use of ADP facilities and professionals.2 5
196 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 125(b)(3). See text ac-
companying notes 437-43, infra.
197 Id. § 125(b) (2).
198 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 321 (a).
199 Ibid., amending Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, supra note 115, § 203(d) (2).
200 Id. § 203(d) (3).
201 Id. § 203(e). See generally Kravitz, supra note 123.
202 Id. § 231.
203 Id. § 234.
204 Supra note 151.
205 See supra note 82.
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But this concept was deleted on the House floor, as discussed."' In the other
instance, the Congress had voted to entitle the minority on each standing com-
mittee of the House to at least one-third of the funds provided for the appoint-
ment of committee staff personnel.2 ' However, the Democrats bound them-
selves in caucus just prior to the convening of the 92nd Congress and pushed
through a resolution rescinding this "minority staffing" provision.
20 8
The 1970 Act also authorizes House and Senate committees to procure the
services of temporary consultants,"' and to provide assistance in obtaining spe-
cialized training for their professional staff members.210  The Act also increases
the number of professional staff members of House and Senate standing com-
mittees to six, with two for the minority, and the number of clerical staff to six,
with one for the minority committee members.2 1'
To enable the Congress to cope with modern-day federal budgets, the
Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the Department of the Treasury and the
Office of Management and Budget, along with the General Accounting Office,
to establish and maintain a standardized information and data processing system
for budgetary and fiscal data for use by all federal agencies.2 1  The Depart-
ment of the Treasury and the O.M.B., in coordination with the G.A.O., are
also now required to establish and maintain standard classifications of programs,
activities, receipts, and expenditures of federal agencies, to meet the needs of
the branches of government and facilitate the establishment and maintenance of
the aforementioned data processing system through the utilizatiol of AD? tech-
niques. 12  These governmental agencies must report to the Congress annually
with respect to the performance of the foregoing duties and functions. 14 More-
over, the Treasury and the O.M.B. are further required to furnish to any con-
gressional committee the program and fiscal data available in the executive
branch, and, where feasible, prepare summaries of such data.21  Similarly, the
Comptroller General is required to review and analyze the results of government
programs and activities for the Congress, and to provide expert assistance in
conducting and analyzing cost-benefit studies.1 6
An administration submitting a new program or change in an existing one
to the Congress must now submit a budget estimate not only for the ensuing
fiscal year but also for the subsequent four fiscal years.2  Likewise, the legislative
committees of the Congress generally are now obligated to make in their reports
six-year projections of the estimated costs of the programs embodied in their
reported bills (other than revenue measures), as well as a comparison of such
206 See text accompanying notes 83-9, supra.
207 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 110(b), amending RULES OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XI, clause 32(c).
208 See text accompanying notes 432-6 infra.
209 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 303.
210 Id. § 304.
211 Id. §§ 301, 302 (excepting the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the House
Committees on Appropriations and Standards of Official Conduct).
212 Id. § 201.
213 Id. § 202(a).
214 Id. § 202(b). See 117 CoO. Rxc. E10404 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1971).
215 Id. § 203.
216 Id. § 204.
217 Id. § 221(a).
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estimate with any estimate of costs made by a federal agency.218 After the an-
nual budget is presented to the Congress, and by June 1 of each year, the Presi-
dent must (beginning in 1972) transmit a supplemental budget to the Congress,
containing a complete and current summary of revised appraisals of budget
estimates and obligations. 19
Miscellaneous Provisions
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 established a permanent Joint
Committee on Congressional Operations," ° to--
make a continuing study of the organization fnd operation of the Congress
of the United States and. . . [to] recommend improvements in such orga-
nization and operation with a view toward strengthening Congress, simplify-
ing its operations, improving its relationships with other branches of the
United States Government, and enabling it better to meet its responsibilities
under the Constitution of the United Statesl
and to--
identify any court proceeding or action which, in the opinion of the Joint
Committee, is of vital interest to the Congress, or to either House of the
Congress, as a constitutionally established institution of the Federal Govern-
ment and call such proceeding or action to the attention of the House of
the Congress which is specifically concerned or to both Houses of the Con-
gress if both Houses are concerned.m2a
However, as in the past, the Joint Committee is forbidden to "make any recom-
mendations with respect to the rules, parliamentary procedure, practices, or
precedents of either House or the consideration of any matter on the floor of
either House."223
The Resident Commissioner to the United States from Puerto Rico is
now elected to House standing committees in the same manner as House mem-
bers are selected (previously, the Commissioner was automatically a member
of three committees) and has the right to vote in his committees." 4
Other provisions of the 1970 Reorganization Act require the House Parlia-
mentarian to revise the compilation of the House's parliamentary precedents
at least once every five years," establish the John W. McCormack Residential
218 Id. § 252 (excepting the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the House Com-
mittees on Appropriations, House Administration, Rules, and Standards of Official Conduct).
See text accompanying note 98, supra. It has been proposed that committee reports contain
an analysis and evaluation of the environmental impact of the accompanying measure; see
H.R. Res. 647, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
219 Id. § 221(b).
220 Id. § 401(a).
221 Id. § 402(a)(1).
222 Id. § 402(a)'(2).
223 Id. § 402(d).
224 Id. § 129(b).
225 Id. § 331.
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Page School and dormitory,22 authorize free guided tours of the Capitol, 2 7
abolish the Joint Committee on Immigration and National Policy 228 and the
Office of Coordinator of Information,"' convert the "base pay" system of the
House to a gross pay structure, 2 ' and rewrite the statutory authority for the
Office of Legislative Counsel in the House 31 to enable the O.L.A. to assist in
"the achievement of a clear, faithful, and coherent expression of legislative poli-
cies.
23 2
The 1970 Reorganization Act further authorizes the Speaker to appoint
a Special Commission on Modernization of House Gallery Facilities, to study
the structure and uses of the House gallery, and to formulate a program for
modernization and improvement of the facilities.33 The Commission is charged
with seeking ways "to improve the physical conditions under which the proceed-
ings on the floor of the House are conducted" and "to provide for spectators in
the House galleries modernized and improved accommodations for their enlight-
enment, information, and understanding" with respect to House floor pro-
ceedings and the role of the House in general. The program is to provide for
soundproofing and enclosure of the galleries with "transparent coverage," in-
stallation of facilities by which explanation of the proceedings on the House
floor may be made to visitors, and a means to facilitate the consultation of
legislative materials and the taking of written notes in the galleries. The
Commission's study was to be completed by the close of the first session of the
92nd Congress,234 i.e., late in 1971.
Some Rejections
During consideration of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, numer-
ous other aspects of congressional reform were discussed but failed to secure
approval. The House considered but rejected two attempts, and the Senate
one, to modify the system of selection of committee chairmen by seniority.3 '
The House refused to approve an amendment to clarify and make more accurate
the Congressional Record. 286 A challenge to the sacrosanct "closed rule"
(whereby no amendments may be offered to a measure under consideration in
the House without permission from the chairman of the committee which re-
ported it, i.e., the House Committee on Ways and Means) was ruled out of
order.2 7 The House declined to require a roll-call vote on final consideration
of every appropriation bill.23 8
Other unsuccessful amendments include: mandatory installation in the
226 Id. § 492.
227 Id. § 441.
228 Id. § 421.
229 Id. § 322.
230 Id. § 474.
231 Id. § 501.
232 Id. § 502.
233 Id. § 499(a).
234 Id. § 499(c).
235 See text accompanying notes 259-65, infra.
236 See text accompanying notes 425-7, infra.
237 116 CONG. REC. H7385 (daily ed. July 29, 1970).
238 116 CONG. Rsc. H7153, H7154 (daily ed. July 27, 1970).
[February, 1972]
CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
House of automatic voting procedures by 1972,239 a Minority Committee on
Investigations to enable the minority party in Congress to exercise separate
oversight and investigatory functions,'" maximum term for House committee
chairmen of eight years unless the House by a two-thirds vote suspends the
limitation, 241 and a change in the fiscal year of the federal government, to
extend from October 1 through September 30.22 Additional amendments,
many technical in nature, were also rejected.
Commentary
In view of the multitudinous problems confronting the Congress and the
many reforms so long overdue, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 is
an exiguous version of what should have been. In many ways, the 1970 Act
bears out the admonition, expressed earlier,143 as to the distortions and simula-
tions potentially inherent in procedural reform: such reform is often make-
shift reform-a response to public insistence that the Congress improve its
practices by scattered tinkering with isolated aspects of congressional operations
to contrive the appearance of authentic reform of the Congress. Yet the Act
contains some substantial reform measures, in large part due to the energetic
efforts of younger members of the House who succeeded in attaching a series
of important reform amendments to the bill. On balance, the Act makes im-
portant contributions toward improved congressional reorganization and, con-
sidering the framework of politics and vested interests in which it was enacted,
it is another illustration of what might have been bowing to what is possible.
VII. Congressional Reform: Some Recent Events
A. The Seniority System
To anyone who has ever pondered reorganization of the Congress, the
idea of congressional reform undoubtedly brings quickest to mind the seniority
system. Elimination of the system of congressional seniority, whereby longevity
results in committee chairmanships, is certainly the most popularized of reform
proposals. Detractors of the Congress often point first to the seniority system,
whether in excoriation of the Congress for inefficiency or for languor, or in
lament over lost legislation or an allegedly misdirected bill.
The seniority system is the product of rigid custom, not requirement. The
selection of congressional committee leadership positions is a function of the
political parties: the choices are made by the Republican and Democratic cau-
cuses, wholly outside the regulation of any statute, or House or Senate rule. (Al-
though, for example, the House's rules provide that the House shall biannually
239 116 CoNG. RBa. H7177, H7187 '(daily ed. July 27, 4970).
240 116 CONG. REc. H7392 (daily ed. July 29, 1970).
241 116 CoNo. REc. H8723 (daily ed. Sep. 15, 1970).
242 116 CoNo. REc. H8728, H8729 (daily ed. Sep. 15, 1970).
243 See text following note 34, supra.
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elect the committee chairmen, this exercise is a pro forma ratification of the
caucus' decisions. 2")
Under the strict seniority system, length of continuous service on a partic-
ular committee and membership in the majority party at the time the chair-
manship becomes open are the sole prerequisites for becoming chairman of that
committee. (Of course, the two essential elements comprising length of service
are to remain alive and enjoy repeated re-election.) Thus, under the seniority
rule, the senior majority party member of a committee automatically becomes
its chairman, and the senior minority party member is mechanically designated
the ranking minority member.
The chief effect of the seniority system has been to place in committee chair-
manships members from safe, essentially one-party districts, who are notorious
for deserting the policy positions adopted by the national party. For example,
in the 92nd Congress, ten of sixteen Senate committee chairmen and nine of
twenty-one House committee chairmen are Democrats from Southern states,
who traditionally withhold support from-or openly attack-various issue posi-
tions (e.g., support of civil rights legislation) of the "national" Democrats. Most
of the committee chairmen, at a time of great urbanization and urgency in
finding solutions to the dilemma of the cities, hail from rural districts.
Perhaps the most visible-and most often discussed-aspect of the con-
gressional seniority system is the age of the chairmen, for generally members
must wait many years (sometimes decades) before assuming a committee leader-
ship position.24 In the 92nd Congress, six committee chairmen and five rank-
ing minority members in the Senate are over the age of 70. In the House, ten
committee chairmen and two ranking minority members are over 70, and three
chairmen are over 80.24 Nonetheless, as Dr. Robert N. Butler has written:
"The crucial issue is not how old the committee chairmen should be, but how
much power they should have, how it should be used, and how the committee
chairmen should be chosen."24  It is now commonplace to say that the real work
of the Congress is performed in committees, and thus chairmanships are a major
source of congressional power: the chairmen appoint subcommittees, manage
staff activities, generally regulate the testimony at committee hearings, and
determine the scope of committee investigations.24
The rationales underlying the congressional seniority system, as well as
244 See text accompanying note 263, infra. Says Representative Richard Boiling (D-Mo.):
"The present rules of the House provide-and everybody knows that it is a pro forma act-
that the House will elect chairmen of committees." 116 CONG. REc. H7253 (daily ed. July 27,
1970).
245 For example, the present Chairman of the House Committee on Rules, Representative
William M. Colmer (D-Miss.), waited 34 years to become Chairman; Representative Chet
Holifield '(D-Cal.) spent 28 years on the House Committee on Government Operations before
attaining the chairmanship.
246 By contrast, the average age of Presidents and Vice-Presidents at the time of inauguration
for the period 1789 to 1969 is about 55.0 years and 55.5 years, respectively; the average age
of Supreme Court Justices at the time of appointment for the same period is 52.9 years. See
Rubin, The Age Structure of Political Power, 24 AMERICAN STATISTIciAN No. 5 at 33 (1970).
247 Butler, Fighting Seniority With Bigotry, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, June, 1971, at 37-
42. Dr. Butler adds: "[rileformers have focused on seniority as that system which perpetuates an
impervious wrinkled wall of old men guarding against democracy." Id. at 37.
248 See generally Goodwin, The Seniority System In Congress, 53 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 416
(1959).
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the arguments for its abolition, are manifold.249 Inevitably, proponents of
seniority paraphrase Winston Churchill on democracy by saying that seniority
may be "the worst possible system except for all the alternatives."2 ' Clearly,
the strict seniority rule has the virtue of rendering succession to committee chair-
manships automatic, thereby avoiding major disagreements over politics, power,
and personality during the initial days in odd-numbered years when the Con-
gress organizes. Congressman James Burke (D-Mass.) sees in the seniority rule
an assurance of independence from vested interests on the part of members-
an assurance that "[t]here is a future for men like myself here who come in
here [the House] and do not depend on the powerful tycoons of this Nation
to get elected."'2 51 The other principal consideration favoring seniority is that
the system assures the accession to a chairmanship of a member presumably ex-
perienced in the operations of his committee and possessed of expertise in the
field of his committee's jurisdiction. Representative Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.),
Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, summarizes this view:
"Fundamentally, the seniority system avoids the waste implicit in instability
of committee composition and management. It invokes the presumption that,
other things being equal, the man or woman with the greatest experience in a
particular job is best fitted to participate and to lead in its performance." 252
Opponents of the seniority rule emphasize that it enthrones chairmen on
the basis of chance rather than merit, it disregards ability in favor of undue
age,25 it renders chairmen immune from accountability and unresponsive to the
majority party leadership and the public, and it discourages active and dynamic
legislators by causing younger members to lose interest and occasionally leave
congressional service. Capitol Hill observer David S. Broder writes that the
seniority system vitiates the principle of "access"-the idea that "all those with
a stake in a decision ought to have reasonable equality of opportunity to bring
their influence to bear on the decision-makers"-by removing committee chair-
men "from the arena of access competition." 254  Repeatedly, critics of seniority
disparage the system for estranging the Congress from the populace and render-
ing the national legislature insensitive to public interests and needs. "Absolute
reliance . . . upon the seniority system," says Representative Michael Harring-
ton (D-Mass.), has removed the House "from the mainstream of American life
and has blighted its chances of focusing on those national issues most relevant
to Americans today.' 255  Then, too, the great virtue ascribed to seniority-
249 See, e.g., Six Virtues of the Seniority System, remarks of Donald E. Deuster, reprinted
at 117 CONG. REc. E338 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1971). See also remarks of Representative John G.
Schmitz (R-Cal.), The Seniority System in Congress, 116 CoNG. REc. E9898-9 (daily ed. Nov.
25, 1970).
250 See, e.g., comment of the then House Majority Leader '(now Speaker) Carl Albert(D-Okl.), quoted in Lyons, Seniority Rule Stirs Discontent in Congress, Wash. Post, Mar.
16, 1970, at A6. See also remarks of Representative Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.) at 116 CON.
REc. H7255 (daily ed. July 27, 1970).
251 Remarks of Representative Burke, 116 CONo. REo. H1692 (daily ed. March 11, 1970).
252 Celler, The Seniority Rule in Congress, 14 W. POL. Q. 161 (1961).
253 As an illustration, the New York Times editorialized, on Jan. 18, 1971, that numbered
among the beneficiaries and defenders of the seniority system are the "deaf, doddering, cantan-
kerous, prejudiced and irascible [committee] chairmen" (p. 38).
254 Broder, Modernizing Congress, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1971, at A17.
255 Remarks of Representative Harrington, 116 CONG. REc. H1691 '(daily ed. Mar. 11,
1970). Representative Ken Hechier (D-W.Va.) states: "[T]he longer I serve in the Congress,
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the fostering of experience-can be overstressed. For, as Harold J. Laski wrote
forty years ago, "expertise, it may be argued, sacrifices the insight of common
sense to intensity of experience . . . [t]he wisdom that is needed for the direc-
tion of affairs is not an expert technic but a balanced equilibrium."25
Advocates of abolition of the seniority system have often been divided
over the question of whether the selection of committee chairmen and ranking
minority members falls within the province of House and Senate rules, or is
the responsibility of the party caucuses within each body. Thus, although Sen-
ators Charles McC. Mathias (R-Md.) and Fred R. Harris (D-Okl.) resorted
to the stratagem of holding special hearings on the seniority system just prior
to the convening of the 92nd Congress, in an effort to publicize what they
viewed as the need to reform the system, Senator Harris was later to state that
"despite . . . possible gains to be made by floor action, I am increasingly per-
suaded that the party caucuses offer the best long-term prospects for Senate
[seniority] reform."257
For the time being, at least, the Congress shows no sign of deviating from
the prevailing view that the choice of committee leaders is in the domain of the
party caucuses.25 This view was repeatedly brought out during the House
and Senate debates on the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. On that
occasion, Representative Fred Schwengel (D-Iowa) offered an amendment to
require that the majority and minority committee members elect by secret
ballot the chairman and ranking minority member of each House committee
from the three most senior members of each party within the committees.2 9
Senator Robert Packwood (D-Ore.) proposed that the chairman and ranking
minority member of each standing, select, and special committee of the Senate
be chosen by majority vote. 6 The Schwengel amendment was defeated 196
to 28,2"1 and the Packwood amendment failed to win approval by a 46 to 22
vote.
262
Representative Henry S. Reuss (D-Wis.) was also unsuccessful in his
attempt to amend the 1970 Reform Act with respect to seniority, despite the rela-
the more evils I see in the seniority system, which puts a premium on those who can survive, elec-
tion after election, regardless of their ability, their responsiveness to public attitudes, and their
philosophy as it relates to the policies of their political party." 116 CoNG. REc. H7190 (daily
ed. July 27, 1970).
256 Laski, The Limitations of the Expert, 162 HARPER'S 101, 105 (1930).
257 Harris, The Senate Can Be Reformed, Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1971, at B6.
258 See text preceding note 279, infra. The collective viewpoint of the Congress in this
regard was probably expressed by Representative Robert C. Eckhardt (D-Tex.), when he said:
"I think the caucus of the majority party, and its opposition on the minority side, is the
ultimate basis of Anglo-American effectiveness in a legislative body." 116 CoNo. RPc. H7258
(daily ed. July 28, 1970). Or, as Representative Barber Conable (R-N.Y.) has stated, "it
seems to me entirely appropriate to handle this issue [seniority] on a party basis and not by
changing the rules of the House." 116 CONG. REc. H7252 (daily ed. July 27, 1970). At any
rate, Representative B. F. Sisk (D-Cal.), during debate on the Legislative Reorganization
Act of .1970, told the House that "this is not the bill and not the time in which to get in-
volved in this subject." Ibid.
259 116 CONG. REC. H7190 (daily ed. July 27, 1970). During debate on this proposal, then
House Speaker John McCormack said: "You could have the worst scandals in the world if
an election from among the first three members of a committee happens to take place in the
House." 116 CoNG. REC. H7257 (daily ed. July 7, 1970).
260 116 CoNo. Rc. S17149 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970).
261 116 CONG. REc. H7272 (daily ed. July 28, 1970).
262 116 CONG. REc. S17160 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970).
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five innocuousness of his proposal. Representative Reuss wanted to simply
amend the House rule which provides that "[a]t the commencement of each
Congress, the House shall elect as chairman of each standing committee one of
the Members thereof" by adding "who need not be the Member with the longest
consecutive service on the committee."2 ' As Representative Reuss explained
it, his amendment would have meant that "length of service shall not be the
sole and exclusive consideration in selecting committee chairmen" and that it
would leave to both the parties [the responsibility for] work[ing] out the de-
tails and the modalities."2 4  Nonetheless, the Reuss amendment was defeated
160 to 73.285
Despite sixty years of resistance, the seniority rule was somewhat modified
at the outset of the 92nd Congress. Wrought by the forces of public opinion,
continuous pressure from younger members of both parties (known as the "young
turks"), and some "public interest" lobbying, the system of automatic strict
seniority in the Congress, at least as evidenced in the formal rules, was discarded.
The vehicles for this historic change were not the rules of the House and Senate
but the rules of the party caucuses.
The Republicans in the House devised the more substantive of the changes
(occasioned in part because, as members of the minority party, they are not
immediately destined for committee chairmanships in any case). The Repub-
licans adopted a procedure, developed by a task force led by Representative
Barber Conable (N.Y.), requiring an automatic secret vote by all Republican
members on nominations for ranking minority committee members or, when the
majority party, committee chairmen. Furthermore, the Republican caucus rules
were revised to contain a statement that the Committee on Committees (com-
posed of one Republican member from each state having Republican representa-
tion in the House) need not follow seniority when preparing committee assign-
ments for approval (which has normally been pro forma) by the caucus.
The Democratic caucus, following the recommendations of a study cor-
mittee headed by Representative Julia B. Hansen (Wash.), approved a plan
instituting a caucus vote, when requested by ten members, on any nomination
for chairman or on the committee seniority of any member (unlike the Republican
approach, however, this scheme requires members to openly challenge a nomina-
tion) .26' Like the Republicans, the Democrats also voted to insert a statement in
their caucus rules that the committee on committees (the Democratic members of
263 Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule X, clause 3. 116 CONG. REc. H7189 (daily
ed. July 27, 1970).
264 116 CONG. REa. H7190 (daily ed. July 27, 1970).
265 116 CoNo. REO. H7272 (daily ed. July 27, 1970).
266 House Democrats acted swiftly to try out this new rule. The Democratic committee on
committees, despite the caucus revision of the seniority rule, recommended chairmanships for
the 92nd Congress according to strict seniority. Critics of Representative John L. McMillan(D-S.C.), Chairman of the House Committee on the District of Columbia, announced, prior
to the caucus, that they would seek his removal from that post. At the meeting on Feb. 3,
1971, the ouster attempt was defeated, 126 to 96, enabling Representative McMillan to con-
tinue as Chairman of the District of Columbia committee. (A subsequent move to challenge
Representative McMillan at the time the House approved the caucus-selected committee assign-
ments--generaly a routine matter-also failed.) Ironically, Chairman McMillan disregarded the
seniority rule in selecting chairmen for his committee's subcommittees, although one of the
subcommittee chairmen, Representative John Dowdy (D-Tex.). was forced to resign several
weeks later because of physical and mental ailments.
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the House Committee on Ways and Means) is not bound by seniority in drawing
up committee assignments. Additionally, the Democratic caucus voted to gen-
erally restrict members to one subcommittee chairmanship apiece, thereby making
about thirty of such positions available to younger members and to limit the
chairman of a parent committee to chairmanship of only one of such full com-
mittee's subcommittees. 5
The seniority reform movement also reached the Senate, in part because of
the efforts of Senators Mathias, Harris and others. The Senate Committee on
Rules, in February, 1971, rejected a Mathias-Harris resolution 69 to modify the
Senate seniority rule by requiring the party caucuses to nominate committee
chairmen and ranking minority members, with election by the full Senate. How-
ever, Senator Mathias was successful in securing modification of the Senate
Republicans' caucus rules to prohibit senators of that party from being ranking
minority members of more than one standing committee, thereby making com-
mittee minority leadership positions available to other-and generally younger-
Republican senators."' Senate Republicans also voted to establish a special com-
mittee to study seniority, with the obligation to report to the caucus prior to the
267 See text accompanying note 444, infra.
268 Early in 1970, at the outset of the second session of the 91st Congress, leaders of the
Democratic Study Group (an informal organization of liberal House Democrats) announced
a move to explore the issue of seniority in the coming Democratic caucus. The plan was to
create a special study committee to consider modification of the seniority rule. The caucus met
on Feb. 18, 1970, but, after tabling a resolution offered by Representative Jerome R. Waldie
(D-Cal.) expressing lack of confidence in the House leadership (particularly Speaker John W.
McCormack, who announced his retirement three months later), postponed for one month
consideration of the question of initiating the seniority study. When the Democratic caucus
reconvened on March 18, 1970, establishment of the study committee was approved, but with
the condition that its findings be delayed until after the November congressional elections (this
so enraged some reformers in the Democratic party that they threatened to vote with the Re-
publicans in organizing the House in January, 1971, although that failed to materialize). The
Republican plan, which was endorsed by the House Republican leadership, was likewise put
off for a vote until the 92nd Congress convened.
269 S. Res. 17, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
270 Among the unexpected consequences of adoption of the Mathias revision of the Re-
publicans' caucus rules was elevation of Senator Mathias to the ranking minority position on the
Senate Committee on the District of Columbia. This is how it came about: Senator Wallace
F. Bennett (Utah) had dual minority leadership positions on the Senate Committees on Finance
and Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; Senator George D. Aiken (Vt.) held dual positions
on the Committees on Foreign Relations and Agriculture and Forestry; and Senator Margaret
C. Smith '(Me.) held dual positions on the Committees on Armed Services and Aeronautical
and Space Sciences. Senator Bennett chose the Finance Committee, thereby elevating Senator
John G. Tower (Tex.) on the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee; Senator Aiken
selected the Foreign Relations Committee, thereby elevating Senator Jack Miller (Iowa) on
the Agriculture and Forestry Committee; and Senator Smith opted for the Armed Services
Committee, thereby elevating Senator Carl T. Curtis (Neb.) on the Aeronautical and Space
Sciences Committee. However, Senator Curtis was already the ranking minority member on
the Rules and Administration Committee; he chose the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Com-
mittee, elevating Senator John S. Cooper (Ky.) on the Committee on Rules and Administration.
But since Senator Cooper was already ranking on the Public Works Committee and as he
elected to retain that position, the minority leadership post fell to Senator Hugh Scott '(Pa.).
Senator Scott was ineligible, as minority floor leader, as was the next in line, Senator Robert
P. Griffin (Mich.), who is the deputy floor leader. The next available senator was Senator
Strom Thurmond (S.C.), who was scheduled to become the ranking minority member on the
new Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Senator Winston L. Prouty '(Vt.) decided to
give up his position on the District of Columbia Committee and assume the top minority post
on the Rules and Administration Committee, thereby rendering available the ranking minority
position on the D.C. Committee to the next eligible senator, Senator Mathias. Measured
either in terms of individual age or length of service, the minority leadership positions thus
became available to younger and/or newer senators.
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convening of the 93rd Congress. The Democrats in the Senate, in their caucus,
agreed that Steering Committee appointments of chairmen and members of
Senate committees must receive the approval of the caucus. And, the Senate
Democrats decided to hold regular monthly caucus meetings to enable, in the
words of Senator John V. Tunney (D-Cal.), "the majority to impress their views
upon the committee chairmen and the Democratic leadership.1"2 71
The basic importance of these changes in the seniority system in the Congress
is the establishment of the principle-in theory if not in practice-that longevity
is no longer the sole precondition to a chairmanship or ranking minority member
position. It does not, however, herald any imminent drastic change in the exist-
ing roster of committee chairmen, although, as noted, 72 several Senate ranking
minority positions exchanged hands as a result of the new seniority guidelines.
(Of course, most of the proponents of abolition of the seniority rule do not
actually advocate the complete abandonment of seniority as a prerequisite to
becoming chairman but seek to institute a procedure whereby those who are in-
capable of assuming such a position are either sidetracked or removed2 7") None-
theless, these changes have introduced a certain flexibility in the Senate and
House seniority rules. As Time magazine observed, the ferment over seniority
indicates a "changing tone in the tradition-minded House of Representatives; the
seniority system is no longer sacrosanct." 274
Proposals abound for reforming the seniority system still further. Repre-
sentative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. (R-Cal.) has recommended a procedure where-
by a slate of proposed chairmen would be presented to the caucus, which would
select committee chairmen by secret ballot; in the case of non-unanimous choices,
the caucus dissenters could propose alternate candidates to the full House, which
would choose, again by secret ballot, between the two nominees.7 Representative
Richard Boiling (D-Mo.) would have the Speaker of the House nominate com-
mittee chairmen, with the selections subject to the confirmation or disapproval
of the majority party caucus.276 Representative Schwengel's and Senator Pack-
wood's plans have been discussed 7 Some have proposed that, seniority notwith-
standing, a committee chairman or ranking minority member should relinquish
his position at a prescribed age-usually 65 or 70."7' Other variations are legion.
Realistic reform of the seniority rule appears, at least for the well-foreseeable
future, to mean implementation of a means by which the incompetent-what-
271 Tunney, Congressional Reform-Bridging the Confidence Gap, 117 CONG. Rac. E5436
(daily ed. June 4, 1971).
272 See note 270, supra.
273 Former Representative Clark MacGregor (R-Minn.) stated, during debate on the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, that "we all know that you are not going to see this
amended rule [House Rule X, cl. 3] used very much even if it is adopted. Neither the Sch-
wengel nor the Reuss amendment [notes 259, 263-5, supra] would result in the most senior Mem-
ber failing to be elected committee chairman except in the highly unusual situation of gross
incompetence or arrogance in the exercise of the chairman's prerogatives." 116 CONG. Rac.
H7268 (daily ed. July 28, 1970).
274 TrmE, Feb. 15, 1971, at 17.
275 Remarks of Representative McCloskey, 116 CONG. REc. E10483 (daily ed. Dec. 18,
1970).
276 R. BOLLING, POWER IN THE HousE 267 (1968).
277 See text accompanying notes 259-62, supra.
278 See, e.g., S. J. Res. 57, H.R. Res. 35, 134, 385, H.R. 4364 and 6364, 92nd Cong., Ist
Sess. (1971).
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ever the infirmity--or party dissident can be removed from consideration for
committee leadership posts; otherwise, seniority will dictate the progression to the
committee chairmanships and minority positions. Recent developments appear
to assure that the matter of congressional seniority is solely within the discretion
of the party caucuses, and is not a subject for determination through House and
Senate rules. At the same time, these and other actions by the caucuses may have
a greater impact on the prospects for future congressional reform, in that the
caucuses have the potential for playing a greater role in subsequent modifications
of congressional processes (assuming that the committee chairmen and other
leaders are willing to work within the caucus framework). Should this material-
ize, inclusion of the leadership in the formative stages of reform developments
by this method would likely result in less dramatic and more gradual (and perhaps
diluted) reforms than the more radical proposals generally advocated outside the
congressional establishment.279
B. The Senate Cloture Rule
The opening days of the 92nd Congress were witness to a historic seven-
week debate in the Senate on the question of changing that body's Rule XXII.28
by lowering, from two-thirds to three-fifths of senators present and voting, the
number of votes necessary to invoke cloture (that is, a limitation on debate, better
known as breaking a filibuster2 .. ). The proposal ultimately failed of passage, as
the resolution to make the rules change was itself filibustered to death by its op-
ponents. Yet, challenges to the Senate's filibuster rule are becoming nearly a
regular biannual exercise.
Unlike the House of Representatives, where the rules severely mitigate
against extended discussion, the Senate traditionally has maintained the right of
unlimited debate. (At the time of the Senate debate, cloture under the two-thirds
requirement had been achieved only eight times in forty-nine attempts since
1917.) Proponents of the two-thirds cloture rule contend that it preserves the
basic role of the Senate as a barrier to domination of the Congress by the executive
branch and generally eliminates the possibility of hasty and unthinking legislating.
Those who advocate easing the present cloture rule maintain that it throws the
Senate into the hands of a small minority on major policy questions and prevents
a majority of the Senate from working its will. 2 ' To some, the filibuster is an
279 See Kraft, Larger Caucus Role, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1971, at A19.
280 Rule XXII of the STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE provides, in part, that "at any time a
motion signed by sixteen Senators, to bring to a close the debate upon any measure, motion,
or other matter pending before the Senate, or the unfinished business, is presented to the
Senate, the Presiding Officer shall at once state the motion to the Senate, and one hour after
the Senate meets on the following calendar day but one, he shall lay the motion before the
Senate and direct that the Secretary call the roll, and, upon the ascertainment that a quorum
is present, the Presiding Officer shall, without debate, submit to the Senate by a yea-and-nay
vote the question: 'Is it the sense of the Senate that the debate shall be ,brought to a close?'
And if that question shall be decided in the affirmative by two-thirds of the Senators present
and voting, then said measure, motion, or other matter pending before the Senate, or the
unfinished business, shall be the unfinished business to the exclusion of all other business until
disposed of."
281 See W. SAFRmE, supra note 120, at 143-4, for an essay on the filibuster.
282 Some advocates of cloture reform contend that, at the beginning of a Congress, a fili-
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anachronism having no place in a modem legislature; to others, a filibuster repre-
sents the Senate at its finest, attempting to exercise independent judgement during
the consideration of important legislation. An effective filibuster, said Senator
J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, "might, God forbid, give senators a chance to think about legislation
before it is enacted. 283
Public attention was recently focused on the Senate's filibuster during the
second session of the 91st Congress. During 1970, filibusters or threats of fil-
ibusters either killed or delayed consideration of an array of legislation: appropria-
tions for the Department of Transportation (because of funds for the supersonic
transport plane (SST)) and the Department of Defense, a special military aid
bill and a regular foreign aid measure (principally because of amendments for-
bidding further military incursions in Cambodia), increases in social security,
the administration's welfare reform program, and a package of trade measures.
In the previous session, the administration's proposals for the antiballistic missile
(ABM) were delayed and the measure to implement direct election of the Presi-
dent was sidetracked by filibusters. Senate leaders were frustrated in their efforts
to schedule legislative business during the closing of the 91st Congress partially
as a result of these actual and potential filibusters.
In the aftermath of these parliamentary entanglements, a resolution to reduce
the number of senators required for cloture, "4 which was introduced on January
15, 1971, by Senators Frank Church (D-Idaho) and James B. Pearson (R-Kan.),
ultimately gained fifty-one (of 100) cosponsors, including Senators Michael
Mansfield (D-Mont.), the Majority Leader, and Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), the
Minority Leader. The debate commenced on January 26, 1971, and ended in
failure on March 9, 1971, despite votes on the question on four separate oc-
casions2. and an indirect endorsement of the rules revision from the President.288
Opposition to cloture reform was largely manned by Southern senators,
mostly Democrats, aided by some Midwestern Republicans, who engineered the
filibuster by subdividing into three five-man teams to effectively sustain the
marathon. In the past, Southern senators have opposed the invoking of cloture
and have utilized the filibuster as a tactic for forestalling or defeating legislation
which they were strongly against, notably civil rights bills. However, the filibuster
as a parliamentary device stands available for any Senate coalition.
During the course of the Senate debate on the Church-Pearson resolution,
buster on a proposed rule change can be ended by a majority vote inder the U. S. Constitution.
Then Vice-President (and President of the Senate) Hubert H. Humphrey so ruled in 1965
(but was overruled by the Senate), as the then Vice-President Richard M. Nixon indicated
he would rule in 1957 and 1959, but Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew declined the opportunity
to similarly rule in 1971.
283 Quoted in Rich, Critics Irked as Senate Asserts Rights, Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1970, in-
serted at 116 CoNG. Rac. S21205 (daily ed. Dec. 28, 1970), by Senator Fulbright.
284 S. Res. 9, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), in 117 CoNo. Rac. S146 (daily ed. Jan. 25,
1971).
285 Attempts to vote on cloture failed 48 to 37 on Feb. 18, 1971; 50 to 36 on Feb. 23,
1971; 48 to 36 on Mar. 2, 1971; and 55 to 39 on Mar. 9, 1971.
286 The President's press secretary, on Feb. 12, 1971, said that "the President would be
in favor of Congress taking action that it feels necessary and that it determines as a body to
reform or to adjust its work procedures and schedules in a way that allows them to deal with
business more promptly and expeditiously." Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1971, at Al.
[Vol. 47: 442]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
several compromises were unveiled, some of which may figure in future cloture
reform attempts. Chief among these alternatives was a proposal by Senator Jack
Miller (R-Iowa) which would have retained the present two-thirds requirement
for cloture on Senate rules changes but permit the termination of filibusters on
other subjects either by two-thirds or by three-fifths where a majority of each
party was included. Other suggestions included: (1) permitting the invoking of
cloture by three-fifths of senators present except for rules changes (so as to prevent
subsequent further lowering of cloture requirements), (2) allowing cloture only
by a two-thirds vote until after three weeks of debate, then reducing the require-
ment to three-fifths, and (3) allowing cloture by a three-fifths vote only on ap-
propriations bills and conference reports.
Undoubtedly, an attempt to modify the cloture rule will be made at the
outset of the 93rd Congress in 1973 but there is little indication that any revision
of the rule is forthcoming. This is partially because advocates of cloture reform
have undermined the strength of their convictions in recent months by resorting
to the filibuster or the threat of filibuster themselves, such as the aforementioned
"unlimited debate" used to block appropriations for the supersonic transport plane
late in the 91st Congress. Moreover, on the most recent filibuster attempt as of
this writing, led by non-Southern Democrats, cloture was invoked by a three-vote
margin to stop the filibuster being conducted against legislation to extend the
military draft8 7 (the conference report on this bill2 8 was itself nearly the target
of a filibuster). Most of the Southern senators, those who traditionally are op-
posed to cutting off debate, voted for cloture on this occasion. It is worth noting
that the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Senator John
Stennis (D-Miss.), voted to terminate debate for the first time in his twenty-
three years in the Senate, while Senator Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), generally the
Senate's most outspoken filibuster foe, voted against cloture. Thus, it has been
effectively demonstrated that even the present two-thirds cloture requirement
does not automatically guarantee an endless filibuster.
It appears that any advantages to be derived from a rules change in the
cloture requirements from, say, two-thirds to a simple majority, would be out-
weighed by the disadvantages of loss of extended public consideration of major
legislation at the only stage in the legislative process where such consideration is,
in nearly all cases, possible. "A lone, filibustering senator, if he's got the guts, may
be able to make the whole country think twice before it's carried off by enthusiasm
or hysteria," observes commentator Nicholas von Hoffman, adding that "[t]he
problem isn't to get Congress to shut up but to get them to shout back." 289 At the
same time, modification of the cloture requirements to allow for termination of
a filibuster by a three-fifths vote is no certain precaution against extended debate.
The crises attributed to filibusters are often more apparent than real, and
generally these hindrances to consideration of legislation can be alleviated by the
287 H.R. 6531, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
288 H.R. REP. No. 92-433, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
As evidence of the changing attitude, three former filibuster fees, Senators Cranston,
Church, and Mathias, on Sep. 29, 1971, took the Senate floor to announce that the present
Rule XXII (suprz note 280) should be retained. 117 CONG. REC. S15266-72 (daily ed. Sep.
29, 1971). See Broder, The Filibuster Flip-Flop, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1971, at A19.
289 Von Hoffman, Shouting Back, Not Shutting Up, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1971, at Bl.
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invocation of some off-stage senatorial courtesies. Thus, even during the rare
"lame-duck" session which concluded the 91st Congress, occasioned in part by the
delay in legislation resulting from filibusters, the Senate met in an unusual secret
session in an effort to break the legislative deadlock. (At the time of the meeting
in secrecy, billions of dollars in appropriations were stymied and two filibusters
were simultaneously in progress.) Some of the controversial legislation was the
subject of compromise and some was deferred as legacies for the 92nd Congress;
still, the republic stands. It is not efficiency but thorough consideration and gen-
eral acceptance which counts for the most in the writing of legislation.
The filibuster is, then, a facet of the Senate scene which will continue-
perhaps deservedly-with its most harmful excesses curbed by some variant of a
cloture requirement. Part of the answer may lie simply in the scheduling of
Senate business; obviously, this would be only of practical value where the
proponents of the filibuster are seeking a full hearing, to "buy time," or to merely
slow down the legislative process, rather than to obstruct the Senate until the
legislation under attack is withdrawn or substantially modified. The Senate
leadership has already made progress in this regard by negotiating with those
directing prolonged debate for bifurcated daily sessions, where part of the day
is given over to the debate and at a uniform hour other matters are taken up.
(This device of daily dual sessions was resorted to in 1970, for example, when
the Senate, snarled because of a major debate over U.S. military activities in
Cambodia, debated the so-called "Cooper-Church resolution" during regular
hours and considered other legislation in the evening.) Perhaps some filibusters-
presumably those of the milder variety2 5°-could be channeled into evening and
weekend periods. While the tempo of American society no longer admits of
protracted legislative deliberations ranging over several weeks to the exclusion
of other business, some imaginative scheduling would permit more lengthly
debates for those who choose to initiate and perpetuate them. Otherwise, should
the traditional Senate filibuster be excessively utilized for obstructionist purposes,
the public may demand severe adjustment of the cloture rule.
C. Office of Technology Assessment
As a myriad of pressing issues-nuclear power development, ecological
problems, space exploration, genetic control, and new health programs, to name
a few-confront the Congress, the potential solutions to these concerns increas-
ingly involve applications of technology. Yet the Congress is critically ill-equipped
to understand and to help channel the potential influences of technology. In
the eyes of many, the Congress' lack of competence in the field of technology
assessment, if not soon remedied, could prove to be disastrous.
290 Dr. Donald R. Matthews, in discussing the functions of debate in the Senate, wrote that
one of the motivations for extended debate is to delay voting on legislation: "Those who
engage in this tactic, and almost all senators do at one time or another, often argue that such
purposely prolonged debate is intended to be 'educational,' that it sticks to the merits or de-
merits of the bill in question, while a filibuster is pure parliamentary obstruction. This dividing
line is very hard to draw, nor is it particularly important to do so." D. MATTHEWS, U.S.
SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 248 (Vintage ed. 1960) (reprinted by permission of the Univ.
of N.C. Press).
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Following five years of study, the House Committee on Science and Astro-
nautics, in August, 1971, reported2"' the proposed Technology Assessment Act
of 1971,292 to create within the legislative branch an Office of Technology Assess-
ment. The O.T.A., which would be guided by a Technology Assessment Board,
is intended to carry out the Committee's declaration of purpose: to equip the
Congress with "new and effective means for securing competent, unbiased in-
formation concerning the effects, physical, economic, social, and political, of the
applications of technology.""29 The Board would be composed of two senators,
two members of the House, the Comptroller General, the Director of the Con-
gressional Research Service, four qualified members from the general public, and
a Director. 94 Among the Office's proposed functions would be the identification
of existing or probable impacts of technology or technological programs, the
preparation of estimates and comparisons of the impacts of alternative methods
and programs, the presentation of findings to the appropriate legislative com-
mittees, and the identification of areas where additional research or data col-
lection is required to provide adequate support for complete assessments and
estimates.295 Cooperative activities and supporting services would be provided
the O.T.A. by the Library of Congress,29 the General Accounting Office,2 7 and
the National Science Foundation. 9 Assessments could be initiated by a com-
mittee chairman, majority of committee members, or by the Board or Director. 99
A prime mover in the struggle to affirm the role of the Congress in tech-
nological assessment and innovation was former Representative Emilio Q. Dad-
dario (D-Conn.), once Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Development. (This subcommittee, established in 1963, has as
one of its objectives the strengthening of "congressional sources of information
and advice in the fields of science and technology." 0 ) Representative Daddario
first introduced legislation in this field in 1967, primarily as a stimulant to dis-
cussion. At that time, he suggested creation of a Technology Assessment Board to
"provide a method for identifying, assessing, publicizing, and dealing with the
implications and effects of applied research and technology." 0 ' The concepts
underlying this legislation stimulated a number of seminars and special studies,
including a landmark review of the kinds of scientific and technological problems
confronting the Congress, submitted in April, 1969, by the Science Policy Re-
search Division of the Library of Congress."0 2 The Subcommittee held hearings on
the institutionalization of technology assessment late in 1969, resulting in a re-
291 H.R. REP. No. 92-469, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
292 H.R. 10243, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
293 Id. § 2(e).
294 Id. § 4.
295 Id. § 3.
296 Id. § 7.
297 Id. § 10.
298 Id. § 8.
299 Id. § 3.
300 See Daddario, Technology Assessment Legislation, 7 HARv. J. LEGis. 507, 508 (1969-70).
301 H.R. 6698, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
302 Technical Information for Congress, prepared by the Science Policy Research Division,
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, for the Subcommittee on Science, Re-
search, and Development, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of
Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (committee print, April 25, 1969).
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vised draft of legislation,1 3 'and by June, 1970, had developed a further re-
vision"0 4 based on additional hearings. The House, however, did not consider the
proposal during the 91st Congress. At the outset of the 92nd Congress, Repre-
sentative John W. Davis (D-Ga.), by then the new Chairman of the House
Science, Research, and Development Subcommittee, introduced an identical
bill,"0 5 and Representative Richard T. Hanna (D-Cal.) and others sponsored a
companion measure."0 0 The Committee on Science and Astronautics approved
its Subcommittee's legislation in July, 1971, with several minor amendments, and
reported a clean bill0 7 on August 16, 1971.
An entity such as the proposed O.T.A., in addition to supplying the Congress
with technology assessment, would greatly assist the Congress in narrowing the
information gap and provide an additional input for the broader task of general
legislative assessment by the Congress. In testimony before the House Subcommit-
tee in mid-1970, the Comptroller General of the United States, Elmer B. Staats,
stated that the proposed Technology Assessment Act "will give the Congress an
effective means to secure competent unbiased information on the effects of tech-
nology and the utilization of such information as one element in the legislative
assessment of matters pending before the Congress."'0 8 Similarly, such legislation
could prove invaluable in improving the Congress' exercise of legislative oversight
and review. "Because of its fragmented committee structure and the tremendous
demands on the time of the individual members, Congress does not at the present
time get an overview of the Federal involvement in research and development,"
former Representative Daddario has said, in calling for "a 'real-time management,
information system' for coordination and management of the Federal science
research and development enterprise."' ' Like so many congressional reform
proposals, this legislation would strengthen the role of the Congress in national
decision-making processes.
D. Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis
The inability of the Congress-as presently structured-to adequately review
and assess the impacts of technology is a facet of the larger dilemma of the
fundamental inadequacy of information upon which social policies and programs
are based. Thus, not only is the Congress il-eqnipped to develop and oversee
public policies, it also lacks the means to measure and compare the costs and
effectiveness of alternative programs. In the words of Senator Walter F. Mondale
(D-Minn.), the Congress "devise[s] and operate[s] programs based on myth and
ignorancc."" '
303 H.R. 17046, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
304 H.R. 18469, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. '(1970).
305 H.R. 3269, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
306 H.R. 7728, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
307 H.R. 10243, supra note 292. See also H.R. 10246, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
308 H.R. RFP. No. 92-469, supra note 291, at 16. See also Lear, Predicting the Consequences
of Technology, SATURDAY REviEW, Mar. 28, 1970, at 44; remarks of Representative John W.
Davis, Technology Assessment and the Congress, 117 CONG. REc. H12396-7 (daily ed. Dec.
13, 1971).
309 Remarks of Representative Daddario before the Information Industry Association, in
116 CoNG. R c. E2884 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1970).
310 Remarks of Senator Mondale, 116 CoNo. REc. S15162 '(daily ed. Sep. 10, 1970).
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Under the leadership of Senators Fred R. Harris (D-Okl.) and Jacob K.
Javits (R-N.Y.), there was consideration in the 90th and 91st Congresses of
predecessor legislation to the proposed Full Opportunity and National Goals and
Priorities Act, designed to monitor developments in various social areas and to
measure progress in meeting related needs. Hearings were held before the Senate
Subcommittee on Government Research during the 90th Congress, resulting in
a discussion bill, 11 and from hearings held by the Senate Subcommittee on the
Evaluation and Planning of Social Programs in the 91st Congress came a suc-
cessor package,31 reported by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare. 313
The thrust of this proposal has been to establish full social opportunity for
all Americans as a national goal, and to establish procedures for advancing this
goal. Patterned generally after the Employment Act of 1946,14 the measure
would create in the President's Executive Office a Council of Social Advisors to
monitor social programs, gather relevant authoritative information and statistical
data, develop a series of "social indicators" to interpret such data and measure
progress made toward achievement of certain social goals, and recommend to the
President the most efficient ways to allocate federal resources and the level of
government best suited to carry out various programs. 15 In addition, the proposed
legislation would require the President to transmit to the Congress each year a
"social report" (much like the existing annual economic report) setting forth the
overall progress and effectiveness of federal efforts in advancing social goals, a
review of state, local, and private efforts in such areas, and his programs and
policies for carrying out the policy of the Act, together with such specific recom-
mendations for legislation as the President may deem desirable."1 6 The social
report would be referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
and the House Committees on Education and Labor, and Interstate and Foreign
Commerce."r The Council of Social Advisers would assist and advise the Presi-
dent in the preparation of the social report.1
The proposed Full Opportunity and National Goals and Priorities Act would
also strengthen the Congress in the field of priorities analysis by establishing,
within the legislative branch, an Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis. 19 As
stated in the Act's declaration of purpose, there is a need for a "framework of
national priorities within which individual decisions can be made in a consistent
and considered manner" and, therefore a need for an entity such as the O.G.P.A.
to "conduct a continuing analysis of national goals and priorities and [to] ...
provide the Congress with the information, data, and analysis necessary for en-
311 The proposed Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act, S. 843, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967). See also H.R. 10261, 10958, 10959, 12497, 13358, 14244, and 14492, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
312 S.5, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. '(1969). Originally, the bill was denominated the Full Oppor-
tunity Act. See also S. 562, H.R. 3338 and H.R. 9483, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
313 S. REP. No. 91-998, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
314 60 Stat. 23 (1946).
315 S. 5, supra note 312, § 103(c).
316 Id. § 102(a).
317 Id. § 102(c).
318 Id. § 103(c) (1).
319 Id. § 202(a).
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lightened priority decisions." 2 ' The Office, working in conjunction with the
Comptroller General and the Office of Management and Budget,12 1 would sup-
ply the Congress with priorities analyses for pending legislation, submit to the
Congress an annual national goals and priorities report, and analyze the Presi-
dent's annual budget requests." As envisioned by its creator, Senator Javits, the
Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis would be a "service staff agency" for the
Congress, and would supply the Joint Economic Committee and other interested
committees with the expertise to enable the Congress to make informed priority
decisions among alternative programs. 23
The Senate passed the Full Opportunity and National Goals and Priorities
Act late in the 91st Congress, 2 4 and the House was unable to act. The bill has
been re-introduced in the 92nd Congress,"' and one day of hearings was held in
July, 1971. This measure deserves further consideration as a means for increasing
the quantity and quality of information needed to pursue national social objec-
tives, and to advance the nation's prospects for meaningful social action. In the
view of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, the proposed
O.G.P.A. "could do much to restore the growing erosion of congressional power
and give substance to the admittedly inl-defined contentions about national
priorities, peace and growth dividends, and fiscal responsibility.""32
E. Other Recent Reform Efforts
Some additional recent developments falling within the broad sphere of
topics labeled "congressional reform" merit mention.
The general discontent arising from the nation's current war experiences has
generated a spate of legislation attempting to define principles to govern deploy-
ment of the armed forces of the United States by the President. For example,
Senator Thomas F. Eagleton (D-Mo.) has proposed a joint resolution which
would write into statutory law a series of relatively explicit provisions regarding
the powers of the Congress and the President to commit the nation's armed
forces to hostilities. 27 This resolution would establish the general rule that the
President may only commit the armed forces to hostilities to the extent authorized
by the Congress through a formal declaration of war, statute, or joint resolution
(and that such authorization could not be inferred from general legislative en-
actments, including appropriations bills).S2' The Eagleton resolution recognizes
that, once the Congress has authorized a troop commitment, the President's
powers as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive provide him with further
authority to invade the territory or airspace of a country with which the United
320 Id. § 201.
321 Id. § 204(b).
322 Id. § 203(a) and (b).
323 Remarks of Senator Javits, 116 CONG. REc. S15165 (daily ed. Sep. 10, 1970).
324 116 CONG. Rc. S15167 (daily ed. Sep. 10, 1970).
325 S. 5, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). This measure was reported from the Senate Special
Subcommittee on Evaluation and Planning of Social Programs to the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare on December 9, 1971.
326 S. REP. No. 91-998, supra note 313, at 5.
327 S.J. Res. 59, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
328 Id. § 2.
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States is not then engaged in hostilities in two instances: when in hot pursuit of a
fleeing enemy who has engaged in battle with U.S. armed forces or when there
is a clear and present danger of an imminent attack on the United States or its
armed forces. 29 This measure would further spell out instances when the Presi-
dent could commit armed forces to hostilities absent congressional authorization,
such as when necessary to repel an attack on the United States or to withdraw
U.S. citizens from a country in which their lives are being endangered,"' ° and
would require the President to promptly report commitments to the Congress.. 1
and apprise the Congress periodically as to the status of hostilities in progress.S
32
Similar legislation has also been introduced in the Senate, such as Senator
Jacob Javits' (R-N.Y.) proposal3 3 to establish certain rules respecting military
hostilities in the absence of a declaration of war, which would forbid the continua-
tion of hostilities beyond thirty days from the date of their initiation unless the
Congress enacts legislation to sustain the commitment beyond that period. 3 '
Senator Robert Taft, Jr. (R-Ohio), in like legislation, has expressly tied his
recommendations to U.S. foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia."'5 The
Taft resolution would provide restrictions on executive warmaking comparable
to the Eagleton and Javits approaches, and would specifically authorize the
"continued deployment" of U.S. armed forces in South Vietnam "for such time
and in such manner as the President, as Commander-in-Chief, shall deem neces-
sary and appropriate to accomplish a responsible and irreversible withdrawal of
such Armed Forces of the United States and the assumption by the Armed
Forces of the Republic of South Vietnam at the earliest feasible date of the
responsibility for the defense of the territorial integrity of the Republic of South
Vietnam."'3 6 These proposals have been the subject of hearings before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations.336a
In the House, a resolution.3 . concerning the war powers of the Congress and
the President was reported 38 by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and
passed the House on August 2, 1971. This measures expresses the "sense of Con-
gress that the President should seek appropriate consultation with the Congress
before involving the Armed Forces of the United States in armed conflict, and
should continue such consultation periodically during such armed conflict." 3 9
The resolution would require the President, where military forces are committed
to armed conflict, to report the action to the House and Senate, setting forth the
circumstances necessitating the commitment, his constitutional and legislative
329 Ibid.
330 Id. . 3.
331 Id. § 4.
332 Id. § 5.
333 S. 731, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
334 Id. § 1 (C).
335 S.J. Res. 18. 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
336 Id. Part II. Related proposals to the Eagleton, Javits, and Taft resolutions include S.
Con. Res. 27, H.R.J. Res. 275, 342, 431. 644, H.R. 4194, 4293, and 7290, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
336a The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on Dec. 7, 1971, ordered favorably re-
ported S. 2956, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), a bill to govern the use of Armed Forces by
the President in the absence of a declaration of war.
337 H.R.J. Res. 1, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
338 H.R. REP. No. 92-383, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
339 H.R.J. Res. 1, supra note 337, § 2.
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authority for so acting, the estimated scope of activities, and "such other informa-
tion as the President may deem useful to the Congress in the fulfillment of its
constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and
to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.'3 40 The Congress, in its zeal to
reclaim full participation in the conduct of military affairs, appears to be heeding
the advice tendered in Proverbs: "Wise men are better than warriors, brain is
better than brawn; for you need policy in war: what saves the state is many a
counsellor." 34'
Mention should also be made of the efforts thus far of the new Joint Com-
mittee on Congressional Operations. 42 The Joint Committee has largely been
immersed in the problems of demarcating its jurisdiction and devising means by
which to carry out its statutory assignments. (The committee is, for example,
attempting to establish regular procedures by which it can monitor legal proceed-
ings of "vital interest" to the Congress. "") As of this writing, the Joint Com-
mittee's only exploration of congressional reform proposals has been a set of
hearings inquiring into the ramifications surrounding conversion of the federal
government's fiscal year so as to coincide with the calendar year in an effort to
improve the congressional budget-consideration process. 44
Thus, during recent months, there has been active consideration of several
varied proposals to modernize the Congress and strengthen its capabilities for full
participation in policy-making processes. Most of these undertakings are in vari-
ous stages of planning and their outcome remains uncertain-in some instances,
unlikely. While there is little evidence that the work of the 92nd Congress will
prove to be a watershed period in the annals of congressional reform, these and
related efforts offer some promise that, in the not-too-far-distant future, the Con-
gress will act further to update its operations.
VIII. Congressional Reform: What Must Be Done
As has been stressed throughout, much remains to be done to improve the
procedures of the Congress, and to enhance the performance of its legislative,
oversight, and representative functions. A list of congressional reforms which
should be implemented or given thoughtful study would include reorganization of
standing committee jurisdictions, increased usage of joint committees, improve-
ment of conference committee operations, further adaptation of computers for the
Congress, encouragement of public interest lobbying, and other proposals.
340 Id. § 3. Section 4 states: "Nothing in this joint resolution is intended to alter the
constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President. or the provisions of existing
treaties."
341 See generally Church, Of Presidents and Caesars, 6 IDAHO L. Rxv. 1 '(1969); Mikva and
Lundy, The 91st Congress and the Constitution, 38 U. Cnx. L. REv. 449 (1971).
342 See text accompanying notes 220-3, supra. See also THE JOINT CoMMITTv ON CON-
GRESSIONAL OPERATIONS: PURPOSE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, JURISDICTION, AND RULES, H.
Doc. No ...... 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
343 See text accompanying note 222, supra.
344 Hearings on the Federal Year As It Relates to the Congressional Bud.get Process
Before the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
The Joint Committee prepared a report on the basis of its hearings ("Changing the Federal
Fiscal Year: Testimony and Analysis." H. Rep. No. 92-614, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)),
but declined to recommend a change in the Federal Fiscal year.
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A. Standing Committee Jurisdiction
Not since the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 has the Congress
undertaken to reorganize its overall committee structure. While some committees
have been added since that legislation, the system of standing committees has
basically remained the same for twenty-five years. If there is any discernible
trend in this area, it is for a greater proliferation of standing committees, such as
for urban affairs,"' transportation, 46 small business, 4 ' constitutional litigation, 4 '
and the environment,349 rather than for consolidation. For example, as part of
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, the Senate created a standing com-
mittee on Veterans' Affairs, 5 ' although it also assigned jurisdiction over urban
affairs in general to the former Committe on Banking and Currency, renamed the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 5'
The current state of congressional committee organization is largely one of
uncommunicated specializations. The circumscribed viewpoints of standing com-
mittees often segregate segments of public problems which are in fact highly
integrated, and denies the Congress an essential comprehensive overview. In
testimony before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress in 1965,
Representative John Brademas (D-Ind.) illustrated the problem: "In my own
committee, the Committee on Education and Labor, we have jurisdiction over
national educational policy, but the work of the National Science Foundation,
which makes such important contributions to education and research, falls under
the jurisdiction of the Science and Astronautics Committee, and there is little
communication between the committees." 53 In similar testimony, former House
Member Thomas B. Curtis recalled how he personally tried to alleviate the paucity
of intercommittee communication. The committee on which he served, the House
Committee on Ways and Means, considers, inter alia, problems relating to lead
and zinc because of their relationship to tariffs and imports. When a proposed
lead and zinc program was referred for consideration to the House Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, Representative Curtis testified before that com-
mittee to alert them to the background material available in his committee. He
noted: "This was done only on an informal basis and was regarded as something
unusual rather than something that would seem to be routine and recognized as
the desirable thing to do."35
There are other aspects of the detrimental nature of the existing committee
structure, other than specialization and failure of communication. For example,
there is considerable overlapping of committee jurisdictions, such as between the
345 See e.g., H.R. Res. 33, 47, 111, 133, 165, 166, and 252, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
346 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 370, 92nd Cong.. 1st Sess. (1971).
347 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 84, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
348 ,See e.g., H.R. Res. 52, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
349 See e.g., H.R. Res. 39, 42, 51, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 99, 101, 106, 140, 152,
174, 191, 224, 249, 352, 386, and 604, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
350 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXV, clause 1 (g).
351 Id. Rule XXV. clause 1(e).
352 ]COC Hearings, supra. note 38, at 590.
353 Id. at 602.
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House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
and the House Committee on Ways and Means, and the House Committee on
Banking and Currency and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs."5' (Ap-
parently this problem has become so exacerbated in the Senate that Senator
Margaret C. Smith (R-Me.) has called for a temporary Special Committee on
Jurisdictional Rules to propose means necessary to prevent jurisdictional conflict
among Senate standing committees."5') Also, an immoderate number of com-
mittees oftentimes overburdens members of Congress, especially in the Senate,
as committee and subcommittee meetings are usually scheduled for the same time.
Finally, in some instances, the relative workload of congressional committees is
unequal, in that a few committees have jurisdiction over most of the major legis-
lation. As former Representative Glenn R. Davis observed, "[s]ome of the com-
mittees, in my opinion, have atrophied into a somewhat less significant position,
so that some committee assignments have become very demanding of time, and
others very little."" 6 In less charitable fashion, William V. Shannon alleges that
of the twenty legislative committees in the House, "only ten have interesting
substantive work to do"; the House Committees on the District of Columbia,
Internal Security, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries are, he charges, "per-
manent floating bull sessions." 5  The time is past for the Congress to realign
these areas of responsibility.
The system of congressional standing committees has been largely con-
structed in response to the organization of the executive branch. That is, the basic
arrangement of committee jurisdiction, as presently constituted, was designed
to cover the problems confronting the Congress with respect to each department
or agency of the federal government. However, the rapid flow of "Great Society"
and like legislation in recent years has given rise to programs involving more than
one agency and falling within more than one committee's jurisdiction.
The existing committee structure of the Congress has become solidified and
the power distributed by the present arrangement deeply entrenched. This was
recently powerfully illustrated by the President's proposal for a vast reshuffling of
the federal bureaucracy, made in his State of the Union message to the 92nd
Congress- " This recommendation has received no consideration in the Con-
gress, largely because it would require, in turn, a sweeping realignment of stand-
ing committee jurisdictions. "What this Congress can be remembered for," the
President said, "is opening the way to a New American Revolution-a peaceful
revolution in which power was turned back to the people-in which government
at all levels was refreshed and renewed, and made truly responsive." 59 As part
of this "revolution," the President asked the Congress to reduce the number of
Cabinet departments from twelve to eight, to "match our structure to our pur-
poses." This would be accomplished by consolidating the Departments of Agri-
354 Id. at 251, 254.
355 S. Res. 147, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
356 ICOC Hearings, supra note 38, at 1598.
357 Shannon, The Lopsided House, N.Y. Times, Sep. 22, 1971, at 43.
358 H.R. Doc. No. 92-1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. '(1971), at 117 CONG. REc. H92 (daily ed.
Jan. 22, 1971).
359 Id. at H95.
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culture, Labor, Housing and Urban Development, Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, Commerce, Interior and Transportation into four cabinet agencies desig-
nated the Departments of Community Development, Economic Affairs, Human
Resources, and Natural Resources.36 (The Departments of State, Treasury,
Justice and Defense would be unaffected by the plan, and the Post Office De-
partment has been absorbed into a government corporation.)
If the Congress were to approve this massive reorganization plan, and if it
were to continue to base its committee structure on the framework of the exec-
utive branch, then the House and Senate committee system would have to be
substantially revised. But the proposal has received a cool reception in Con-
gress, with the prospects of enactment during the 92nd Congress dubious at best.
Senator John L McClelland (D-Ark.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Government Operations, was quoted as saying: "It's such a stupendous task
that it's highly unlikely it could be disposed of at one session of Congress.Ma3 1
And his counterpart, Representative Chet Holifield (D-Cal.), Chairman of the
House Committee on Government Operations, expressing anger that the appro-
priate committee chairmen were not consulted by the President in advance, com-
plained that "[n]obody showed me the courtesy of telling me in advance of what
Mr. Nixon rightly called a 'revolutionary' concept of government." '62
Although not a suggestion destined for immediate implementation, in view
of the vested interests which would be shaken, the congressional standing com-
mittee system should be revamped, beginning with some consolidation of existing
committees. For example, Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.) has suggested
that the Senate Committees on Rules, Post Office and Civil Service, and Govern-
ment Operations be combined into one committee, the Agriculture, Interior and
Insular Affairs, and Public Works Committees be compressed into another, and
the Aeronautical and Space Sciences and Commerce Committees from a third.
"In all three proposed mergers," asserts Senator Proxmire, "there is enough over-
lapping of jurisdiction and activity to justify the combination." 63  As another
illustration, Representative F. Bradford Morse (R-Mass.) contends that the
activities of the eight House standing committees in the field of urban affairs
should be under the auspices of one committee, and that the areas of health
and welfare, presently scattered among four standing committees, be consoli-
dated." 4 Also, a number of House members have proposed that the House Com-
mittee on Internal Security be abolished and the jurisdiction of the House Judi-
ciary Committee be enlarged.6 5
The jurisdictions of the legislative standing committees, as Representative
Morse has suggested, should reflect not so much the organization of the executive
bureaucracy but broad fields of policy-making. Frank H. Weitzel, then Acting
360 Id. at H94. Legislation to implement these proposals was subsequently introduced; see
H.R. 6959 - 6966, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
361 Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1971, at Al.
362 Ibid. Overview hearings on the President's plan were held by the House Subcommittee
on Legislation and Military Operations in June and July, 1971, and on the proposed Depart-
ment of Community Development (H.R. 6962) in November, 1971.
363 JCOC Hearings, supra note 38, at 105.
364 M. MCINNIs, supra note 31, at 59, 61.
365 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 71, 72, 78, 85, 86, 231, 451, 458, 462, 463, 477, 560, 565,
600, and 620. 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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Comptroller General of the United States, among others, has suggested this ap-
proach: "[T]here could be improved oversight and coordination of similar and
related programs that are under the cognizance of two or more existing legislative
committees, if there were created the legislative machinery for a unified review
of the similar and related laws enacted over a period of years for programs as-
signed to several agencies."3 ' As illustrated by the President's proposed "New
American Revolution" reorganization plan, the executive is flexible in terms of
remodeling; the Congress, however, is not.
Even without restructuring the committee system and realigning standing
committee jurisdictions, there are, nonetheless, several other solutions to the re-
lated problems of committee overspecialization and undercommunication. One
approach, which has been resorted to on occasion but merits greater usage, is
for one committee to consider (including hearings) one phase of a particular
bill and another committee of the same house to consider -(concurrently or other-
wise) another phase of the same legislation. (For example, the Airport and Air-
way Development Act of 197067 was considered in the House by the Committees
on Ways and Means and Interstate and Foreign Commerce.) A more elemental
approach in the same direction would be to refer bills to all of the committees
having relevant jurisdiction (at present, once a bill is introduced, in either the
House or Senate, it is referred to only one committee). Another idea which
deserves at least a trial implementation is joint hearings before those committees
having a common interest in the subject matter of the proposed legislation. Still
another device to promote intercommittee consideration, offered by Representa-
tive William L. Springer (R-Ill.), ranking minority member of the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, is the House's procedural motion
to recommit, which now follows (if at all) the conclusion of debate on a measure.
Representative Springer, upon finding no prohibition in the House rules, has sug-
gestcd that, where a committee other than the committee which originally re-
ported a bill has not given the measure consideration and a majority of the House
believes it should have, the measure should be committed to the review of the
second committee."' 8 Similar problems of jurisdiction obtain as between legisla-
tive and appropriations committees, and committees of the House and Senate.
Prime consideration should be given this state of affairs in both the House
and Senate, to enable congressional committees to better grasp the totality of the
issues before them.
B. The Joint Committee Approach
In addition to reorganization of the standing committee structure, con-
sideration needs to be given in the Congress to further reliance on joint commit-
tees. Joint committees have a number of virtues: they serve as additional in-
formation-processing vehicles for the Congress, reduce the necessity for separate
sets of full hearings in the House and Senate standing committees, allow for
366 ICOC Hearings, supra note 38, at 1378.
367 Pub. L. No. 91-258, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
368 ICOC Hearings, supra note 38, at 254.
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greater specialization within the congressional committee structure (while en-
abling the standing committees to pursue more general overviews), and furnish
additional staff support and expertise for the standing committees. In the face
of technological and other complex demands being made upon an already-bur-
dened Congress, the joint committee approach has a multitude of advantages.
This is not, however, to advocate a unicameral Congress. The dual-house
anatomy of the national legislature serves to generally insure a more thorough
consideration of legislation and a broader hearing for all parties potentially
affected than would a one-stop Congress. In a sense, the second house, in
considering.the other's legislative products, performs an appellate function as
underlying policies are re-evaluated and the text of the proposed legislation re-
viewed. Further reliance on the joint committee should be as an enhancement
of, not a substitute for, a standing committee system. Nor should this proposal
for additional joint committees be interpreted as a call for return to the pre-1946
standing committee structure, where tens of committees having narrow juris-
dictional bases proliferated in both the House and Senate. Thus, the grant of
legislative power-the power to consider and report out legislation-to joint
committees should be resorted to sparingly, it at all.
Within the structure of the Congress, as presently fabricated, there is one
joint committee possessing legislative power-the influential Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy. This joint committee, which was established in 1946,89 enables
the Congress to constructively legislate and perform the oversight function in the
area of the development, use, and control of atomic energy. In the words of
Professor of Law Harold P. Green, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is
"an extraordinary congressional committee created as a legislative counterweight
to the exceptional powers granted the executive branch in dealing with atomic
energy, which was regarded as a governmental problem of unprecedented magni-
tude and complexity." '  Because of the legislative power this joint committee
enjoys, there are no standing committees having jurisdiction over atomic energy
matters in the House or Senate, leaving to it alone (except for consideration in
both houses during debate) the performance of the congressional role in this
field.
The joint committee approach to legislation and oversight, as illustrated by
the performance of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, has a significant
potential in the context of securing complete and current information for the
Congress from the executive branch. As an illustration, the Joint Committee
has the authority, not only to "make continuing studies of the activities of the
Atomic Energy Commission," but to be kept "fully and currently informed with
respect to all matters within the Department of Defense relating to the develop-
ment, utilization, or application of atomic energy." '' Furthermore, all govern-
ment agencies are directed to furnish any information requested by the Joint
369 Atomic Energy Act of 1946 § 15(a), 60 Stat. 772 (1946). See Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 § 201, 68 Stat. 956 (1954).
370 Green, The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: A Model for Legislative Reform?
34 GEo. WAsr. L. REv. 932 (1964).
371 42 U.S. 2252 (1964).
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Committee with respect to the agencies' activities or responsibilities in the field
of atomic energy. 7 2
Despite the successes of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, however, a
joint committee does not necessarily have to possess legislative power to be effec-
tive. Joint committees can, as Professor Green noted, operate as "service com-
mittees'" 73 by augmenting the activities of the appropriate House and Senate
standing committees. This is best illustrated by the functions of the joint com-
mittee which nearly dominates the preparation within the Congress of legislation
in its field-the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. Reviewing
the federal tax legislative process from the standpoint of the House, former Con-
gressman Thomas B. Curtis wrote: "That the Ways and Means Committee has
been able to write sound revenue legislation is primarily a tribute to the profes-
sional staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation." 7 ' For ex-
ample, the members of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the
Senate Committee on Finance relied heavily on the staff of this joint committee
during the drafting and amending processes which preceded enactment of the
massive Tax Reform Act of 1969. Thus, as a revenue measure wends its way
through the legislative process, the Joint Committee staff is available to interpret
and explain the intent and the impact of pending-and often complicated-
proposals."" Mr. Curtis states the role of this joint committee and, in so doing,
articulates the contributions a joint committee can make in general: "The
Joint Committee staff works closely with the professional staff of the two finance
committees [House Ways and Means, and Senate Finance] to follow the testi-
mony of expert witnesses in the public hearings and to write the technical language
which supplements and explains each provision of every bill."37
Another illustration of a valuable "service" joint committee is the Joint
Economic Committee, which, through its hearings and reports, processes and
disseminates information on economic developments for the benefit of all perti-
nent committees and interested members. It is significant, for example, that,
while the Congress was officially out of session during the 1971 summer recess,
the Joint Economic Committee held the initial series of hearings on the President's
proposals to stabilize the economy through income tax revision. Other joint
committees serving the Congress include the Joint Committees on Defense Pro-
duction, Printing, and Reduction of Federal Expenditures.
The House recently demonstrated awareness of the potential value of joint
committees in passing legislation 7" to establish a Joint Committee on the En-
vironment.' This Joint Committee would have the duty to "conduct a com-
372 Ibid.
373 Green, supra note 370, at 935.
374 Curtis, The House Committee on Ways and Means: Congress Seen Through A Key
Committee, 1966 Wis. L. Rnv. 121 (1966).
375 See Woodworth, Procedures Followed in Tax Legislation and the Role of the Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 18 S. CAL. TAx. INST. 21 (1966). See also Silver-
stein, Legislative Language and the Tax Legislative Process, 15 N.Y.U. INsT. ON FED. TAx.
1, 3-5 (1957).
376 Curtis. supra note 374, at 127.
377 H.R.J. Res. 3, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), reported from the House Committee on
Rules on May 5, 1971, H.R. REP. No. 92-181, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
378 117 CONG. REC. H6918 (daily ed. July 20, 1971).
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prehensive study and review of the character and extent of environmental
changes" and to develop policies to encourage private investment in means of
improving environmental quality and review recommendations of the President
relating to environmental policy." 9 The committee would not have any legis-
lative authority 80 and would be required to avoid unnecessary duplication with
any investigation undertaken by any other joint committee or House or Senate
standing committee."' Nonetheless, the Joint Committee would enhance the
information resources of the Congress generally and of relevant standing com-
mittees in particular, in such fields as water resources, pollution control, fish and
wildlife, transportation, power supplies, and other services and facilities.
Increased reliance on joint committees as a complement to a system of
standing committees would be of considerable assistance to the Congress. There
is no dearth of proposals suggesting fields a joint committee might explore for the
Congress: crime," 2 foreign intelligence, 3 ' classified information,'8 4 simplification
of tax returns,8 " and treatment of prisoners of war,' to name some current sug-
gestions. The joint committee has proven to be a useful mechanism for securing
information for the Congress, especially from the executive and the bureaucracy.
As a somewhat related function, the joint committee approach can enable the
Congress to cope, at least initially, with the more complex of the problems it con-
fronts. As realignment of the boundaries of the standing committee provinces is
not immediately forthcoming, heavier reliance on joint committees would enable
the Congress to better grasp today's issues.
C. Conference Committees
The legislative impasse which characterized the 91st Congress in its final
throes has been blamed in large part on the rash of filibusters in the Senate.'
However, that congressional standstill was also a product of another, but less
appreciated, development: a breakdown of the workings of House-Senate con-
ferences; Yet the Congress has long avoided conference committee reform. The
Congress, asserts former Senator Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), "has never come to
grips with the archaic ways and the often dictatorial-like powers of conference
committees." '8
The conference committee is an indispensable feature of any bicameral
legislature and certainly of the United States Congress, where nearly every item
of major legislation passes the House and Senate in differing forms, requiring
379 H.R.J. Res. 3, supra note 377, § 2(a).
380 Id. § l(f).
381 Id. § 2(d).
382 See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 46, 55, and 380, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
383 See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 3 and 186, H.R.J. Res. 167, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. '(1971).
384 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 745, 794, 830, 839, 845, H.R. 10102, and H.R. Con. Res. 409,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. '(1971).
385 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 588, 662, 663, and 685, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
386 See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 18, 70, and 279, S. Con. Res. 5, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
Still other suggestions include Joint Committees on Nuclear Development, Peace, Senior Citi-
zens, Energy, and National Security.
387 See text preceding note 284, supra.
388 Gore, The Conference Committee: Congress' Final Filter, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY,
June, 1971, at 43.
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reconciliation to become law. (Occasionally, where the differences are insub-
stantial and noncontroversial, one house will agree to the amendments of the
other, thereby obviating the necessity for arbitration in joint conference.) The
House conferees are appointed by the Speaker and the Senate conferees by that
house's presiding officer; both sets of appointments are customarily made in
accordance with the preferences of the chairmen of the committees which origi-
nally considered the legislation. In general, the conferees may consider only
those matters in disagreement between the two houses (although, in practice, this
standard has occasionally been loosely adhered to 89 ) and are not supposed to
insert new matter not germane to such differences. The conference compromise
appears in the form of a conference report, which cannot be amended in either
the House or Senate, and thus must be accepted or rejected (the latter rarely
occurs) in its entirety. To become law, the House's and Senate's versions of legis-
lation must ultimately be identical; hence, the action of the conferees can poten-
tially undo months of legislative endeavor.
The House and Senate conferees are always members of the standing com-
mittees having jurisdiction over the legislation in disagreement, and the party
affiliations of the conferees generally reflect the political composition of their
respective houses. Also, the conferees are largely only those members enjoying
considerable committee (or subcommittee) seniority. Newly enacted rules re-
quire the conferees to generally negotiate within the positions taken by the House
and Senate, as noted."" Nonetheless, in actuality the individual position of
some conferees may be more in accord with the nature of the legislation as
passed by the other house-and they may follow that inclination. For example,
on the controversial bill to continue federal funding for the supersonic transport
plane, the House had voted to authorize $290 million, while the Senate refused
to authorize any financial assistance. Yet the conferees "compromised" at $210
million after a brief conference. Of the seven Senate conferees, four had voted
to provide federal funding for the aircraft, and one, Senator Warren G. Magnu-
son (D-Wash.), a staunch SST-supporter, openly declared before the conference
agreement was reported that he was still seeking the full $290 million. 9 In
such situations, the adversity comes when the respective houses are called upon to
approve the conference report. When the conferees are out-of-step with the
posture of their respective house (as were the Senate's SST conferees), the result
is often obstruction, internal quarrels, and-in the Senate-filibuster.
Professor Daniel Berman and others have proposed that the practice of ap-
pointing to conference members of the House and Senate who are in disagree-
ment with the bill as passed by their respective chambers be abolished. 92 Albert
Gore has suggested that the slates of conferees be approved in advance by the
full membership of each house, to insure that conferees will represent their
views. 93 He has further recommended that: (1) a record of conference pro-
ceedings be made, with all votes taken therein published in the Congressional
389 See text accompanying notes 437-43, infra.
390 See text accompanying note 196, supra.
391 N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1970, at 26.
392 JCOC Hearings, supra note 38, at 823.
393 Gore, supra note 388, at 47.
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Record, (2) the conference report contain a general explanation of the com-
promises reached (House conferees have generally included an explanatory state-
ment - usually brief - in conference reports 94), and (3) the conference report
contain a statement by the "minority" conferees. 95
These recommendations--especially those relating to the selection of House
and Senate conferees--deserve immediate consideration. Decisions made by a
small group of congressmen, contrary to the wishes of the majority of one house,
can destroy weeks or months of legislative effort. Such a state of affairs is anti-
thetical to established concepts of representative government.
D. Computers for Congress
Enhancement of the operations and effectiveness of the legislative branch
with computers, through adaptation of contemporary automatic data processing
techniques in the sphere of information processing and dissemination, is, as dis-
cussed,"96 essential to the establishment of a modem Congress. The computer
and other electronic devices, however, holds out additional promise for improved
congressional performance and efficiency.
Among the most celebrated and desirable of these potential improvements
is electronic voting. Congress expends an undue amount of time on lengthy and
tedious quorum call and voting procedures. It has been estimated, for example,
based on an average of a five-hour daily session and a 35-minute average for
roll calls and quorum calls (and now recorded teller votes397), that in a twelve-
month session the Congress will consume seventy of such days in record voting
and determining attendance.9 ' This calculation may be somewhat of an exag-
geration, in that quorum calls seldom occupy quite that much time (nor do
Senate roll-call votes) and that annual sessions rarely, if ever, consist of twelve
months of full legislative activity. Nonetheless, during an average congressional
session, at least a month of typical workdays is unnecessarily expended on count-
ing votes and calling the roll.
Over one-half of the state legislatures now utilize some form of electronic
voting,' as does the General Assembly of the United Nations. The successful
experiences of these legislative bodies--stretching over more than fifty years-
have demonstrated the sensibility of this procedure. The prime responsibility of
the legislator is to legislate, not waste untold hours roving Capitol Hill to answer
394 This idea was implemented by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note
151, § 125, whereby the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and the Rules of the House
of Representatives were amended to provide that each report of a committee of conference
must be accompanied by "an explanatory statement prepared jointly by the conferees on the
part of the House and the conferees on the part of the Senate."
395 Gore, supra note 388, at 48. Senator Gore also suggested that conference reports
should be made available at least 48 hours prior to the final vote. This idea was, as has
been discussed (see text accompanying note 197, supra), also implemented by the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 151, § 125.
396 See Part III. supra.
397 See text accompanying notes 194-5, supra.
398 JCOC Hearings, supra note 38, at 6.
399 See FIRST PROGRESS OF THE SPECIAL SuaCOMMITTEE ON ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL
OFFICE EqUIPMENT (prepared by the Working Group [see text accompanying note 86, supra] on
Automatic Data Processing for the House of Representatives), at 60, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, Committee on House Administration (October, 1969).
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for quorums and await the calling of their names through interminable roll calls.
Representative Durward G. Hall (R-Mo.), formerly a practicing surgeon, wrote
that "[a]s a doctor in the House, I abhor the unnecessary waste of human energy
occasioned by frequent running to the floor and by the fretful wait while 435
names are called in alphabetical order." 400
While there are many variations on the theme, a system of electronic voting
might work as follows: Members' names would be listed on a display board in
the House and Senate chambers, on which the votes would be indicated along
with running totals. Following the debate, the vote would be called, the voting
switches centrally unlocked, and each member would cast a yea or nay vote
(or simply indicate "present") from strategically-located voting stations. When
the few-minute voting period was over, the tally would be considered complete,
the switches locked, and the individual and total votes would be recorded, by
machine, photograph, or otherwise." 1
There are other benefits, somewhat intangible, yet no less important, which
would be derived from electronic voting. The public image of the Congress
would be improved if visitors, expecting to view a representative assembly at work,
are not subjected to the monotony and confusion surrounding the recording of a
vote or the ascertainment of a quorum. Certainly mechanical voting minimizes
the opportunity for erroneous vote tallies, something of a minor scandal in re-
cent sessions. Also, like institution of the recorded teller vote, electronic voting
would discourage absenteeism and encourage greater participation in voting.
Critics of electronic voting fear that it would introduce such inflexibility into
the voting procedure that the party leadership would be robbed of the oppor-
tunity to maneuver for additional votes." 2 However, because of the inbred
nature of congressional life, there seems little doubt that ad hoc conferences and
vote-trading would manage to continue without unnecessarily stalling the actual
vote. Automatic voting, moreover, does not have to mean instantaneous voting.
A reasonable procedure could include advance announcement of the vote (e.g.,
15 minutes beforehand) during the debate or, as noted, a standard period for
voting (e.g., 5 minutes), or both. Nor would electronic voting have to compel
continuous attendance during the legislative sessions. While a typical congress-
man's day involves committee and office work and other pursuits off the floor,
this dilemma is less a matter of automatic voting and more a question of present
practices of scheduling votes and arranging individual appointments. Finally,
some members are reluctant to go on record with respect to certain issues. This
aspect of electronic voting could be alleviated somewhat by not utilizing the
automatic tally for every vote; the voice vote and unrecorded teller vote could still
be utilized. Yet, constituencies are entitled to know of their representatives' posi-
400 M. MCINNIs, supra, note 31, at 218.
401 See letter of Representative Samuel N. Friedel, then Chairman of the House Committee
on Administration, to House Members, at 116 CONG. REC. H10862-3 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1970).
The House Administration Committee, in November, 1971, approved a contract containing the
design and specifications of an operational electronic voting system. This system envisions
House Members casting their vote from one of 48 voting stations, with the running tally and
final result posted on display panels located behind the House press gallery in the chamber.
The present schedule calls for preliminary installation of the system in February, 1972, with
the system fully ready for use by late 1972.
402 See, e.g., ICOC Hearings, supra note 38, at 698.
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tion, and in most instances, the public interest is better served by a congressman
having to explain a vote rather than hide from it.
Technological advances which would augment the legislative process extend
far beyond the acts of ascertaining attendance and voting. For example, as Pro-
fessor Mary Ellen Caldwell has discussed, a machine system has the functional
capabilities to perform various record-keeping and record-preparing tasks, such
as preparation of legislative journals, committee reports, and other documents.' 3
Also, as she has pointed out, the computer can be used in properly drafting,
introducing, processing, and enrolling, as well as for publication of, legislation.""4
Colin F. H. Tapper has further canvassed the potential application of com-
puter techniques at various stages of the legislative process." Tapper visualizes
use of the computer during four key phases in the preparation of legislation: (1)
research, through the identification and retrieval of relevant information, includ-
ing the scanning of statutory materials; (2) drafting, by reducing "syntactic
ambiguity";..6 (3) passage, by scheduling consideration of measures, video dis-
plays of proposed amendments in context, electronic voting, and proofreading of
legislation; and (4) printing, through photocomposition techniques, which could
be repeated for preparation of the volumes of each session's laws (United States
Statutes at Large) and for use in developing revised codes. 7
Although Thomas A. Edison invented the first electric legislative voting
device over a century ago, fifty years elapsed before an American legislature (the
Assembly of Wisconsin) installed an electronic voting system (in 1917). "The
computer is much younger and far more precocious," muses Professor Caldwell,
"[h]opefully, it will be incorporated into the legislative process before it, too,
reaches a settled middle age.""' The uses of computers in the legislative process
are manifold, and a substantial computer capability is essential for an effective
Congress.
E. Public Interest Lobbying
As stressed throughout, there is much the Congress can do to augment the
extent and quality of the information transmitted to it. There has been a con-
siderable emphasis thus far herein on improving the Congress' information re-
sources, by various methods, as for example, automatic data processing, joint
committees, and institutions such as an Office of Technology Assessment and an
Office of Priorities Goals and Analysis. Yet much information lies within the
private sector as well. This is an era of the organized cause, a time when private
citizens in unprecedented numbers are joining together in attempts to act in the
403 Caldwell, Legislative Record Keeping in a Computer Journal, 5 HARv. JouR. LEuos.
1, 4-5 (1967).
404 Id. at 6-28.
405 Tapper, Computers and Legislation, 23 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1970).
406 Tapper writes that "syntactic ambiguity" occurs in legislation "when the structure of
a whole sentence is considered, and it yields more than one possible interpretation of the rela-
tionship between its constituent parts." Id. at 31. E.g., the U.S. Constitution prohibits "cruel
and unusual punishments." Is this prohibition applicable to punishments that are both cruel
and unusual, or those which are either? He contrasts this concept with "semantic ambiguity,"
which is a "consequence of the relative imprecision of language." Ibid. E.g., a typed letter
is a "document," but is a bottle label, an autographed baseball bat, or a roll of computer tape?
407 Id. at 28-41.
408 Caldwell, supra note 403, at 32.
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public interest. These group endeavors range over a wide spectrum of matters:
environmental protection, housing, minority and civil rights, urban transporta-
tion, manpower training, care for the aged, poverty, adult education, and a host
of other current social problems and concerns.
These organizations generally develop a wealth of information concerning
their particular work and often are staffed by highly motivated and energetic
individuals, who should be encouraged to forward their group's findings and
ideas to the Congress. But the Congress has, perhaps unwittingly, largely cut
off potential lines of communication with these public interest organizations while
at the same time has fostered lobbying by private business and groups seeking to
advance special interests.
This unfair and unbalanced state of affairs has come about because of the
current disposition of the federal tax laws. In most instances, public interest, as
well as special interest, groups require two tax features to exist: they must be
exempt from income taxation and must be able to attract contributions which are
tax deductible by the contributors. Private interest groups are tax-exempt under
the Internal Revenue Code as "business leagues"4 9 and payments from private
business for their operation are deductible as "ordinary and necessary" trade or
business expenses." The only relevant limitations on this deduction are that
the legislation being influenced must be of direct interest to the taxpayer or must
be the subject of communication between the taxpayer and an organization hav-
ing a direct interest in the legislation, of which he is a member, and that the
deduction will not be allowed for payments to political campaigns or for grass-
roots (i.e., influencing the general public) lobbying." Public interest groups
desiring to acquire both of these federal tax characteristics must obtain classifica-
tion as "charitable" organizations, which also are tax-exempt412 and eligible to
attract contributions, which are deductible by the donor for federal income, gift,
and estate tax purposes.41 3 But "charitable" organizations are proscribed from
"carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation" as
a "substantial part of [their] activities." ' 4 This means that private industry, with
these preferred tax attributes, is able to-and is encouraged to-communicate
with the Congress, while groups acting in the public interest may speak to Con-
gress at the peril of losing their federal tax status." 5
Congress should no longer deny itself access to expertise available on legisla-
tive matters from public interest groups but should revise the Internal Revenue
409 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE [hereinafter I.R.C.] § 501(c) (6).
410 I.R.C. § 162(a).
411 I.R.C. § 162(e). See Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying:
Defining and Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68 COLUM. L. Rav. 801 (1968).
412 I.R.C. § 501(c) (3).
413 I.R.C. § 170(c) (2), 2055 (a) (2), and 2522 (a) (2).
414 I.R.C. §§ 501 (c) (3), 170(c) (2) '(D), 2055(a) (2), and 2522 (a) (2). The law of-
fers no explicit formula for computing "substantial" or "insubstantial" activities. The Sixth
Circuit has suggested that "something less" than five percent of an organization's time and
effort is not "substantial." Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955).
415 The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that a "charitable" organization will not be
considered engaged in prohibitive legislative activity if at the request of a congressional com-
mittee a representative of the organization testifies as an expert witness on pending legislation
affecting the organization. Rev. Rul. 70-449, 1970, INT. REv. BULL. No. 35, at 9.
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Code to permit publicly supported tax-exempt organizations"0 to communicate
directly with the Congress (and state legislatures), as well as with such organiza-
tions' members, to affect legislation of direct interest to them. This would
redress the present imbalance between the permissible activities of special interest
and public interest groups (both should continue to be prohibited from political
campaign activities" 7 and grass-roots lobbying) and would enhance the flow of
information to the legislative branch. As Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me.)
said on the occasion of introducing such legislation,1 8 "if we are to maintain a
democratic form of government in practice, and if the Congress is to reach rea-
soned judgments on the important issues before it, we must assure that every
segment of our society is able to communicate with Congress."4 9
There seems little point in determining that publicly supported charitable
groups act in the public interest and to grant them exemption from federal taxa-
tion, and then silence these organizations when they attempt to contribute to
public policy formulation. However, at the same time this inequity between
public interest and private lobbying organizations is rectified, the Congress would
also make available to itself valuable information, data, and expertise, to assist
it in legislating more effectively.
F. Some Additional Reforms
The foregoing discussion has focused on five particular congressional re-
forms which, once implemented and properly adapted, would considerably im-
prove the operations of the Congress. There are, in addition, a host of other
potential revisions in practice and procedure which merit either adoption or
deserve serious study. A partial list of such important congressional reforms
would include:
1. Establishment of a legislative-executive council or cabinet, to exchange
advice on legislative proposals, and to formally have available lines of communi-
cation between the congressional leadership and the President. Professor Edward
S. Corwin, for example, has proposed that the President "construct his Cabinet
from a joint Legislative Council to be created by the two houses of Congress and
416 The Tax Reform Act of 1969 introduced a statutory distinction between "publicly sup-
ported" organizations exempt from federal income taxation under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) and
"private foundations," which are likewise exempt. See I.R.C. § 509. Separate proscriptions
on legislative activities of private foundations appear in I.R.C. § 4945(e).
417 See I.R.C. §§ 501(c) '(3), 170(c) (2) (D), 2055(a) (2), and 2522(a) (2).
418 S. 1408, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. '(1971). As of this writing, the bill has 24 co-sponsors.
In the House, identical legislation has been introduced, under the leadership of Representative
James W. Symington (D-Mo.); as of this writing, 78 House members have sponsored or co-
sponsored the Symington bill. H.R. 8176, H.R. 8645, H.R. 8920, H.R. 9403, H.R. 9476, H.R.
9691, H.R. 9743, H.R. 9837, H.R. 9934, H.R. 9988, H.R. 10073, H.R. 10152, H.R. 10273,
H.R. 10274, and H.R. 10403, H.R. 10583, H.R. 10584, H.R. 11594, and H.R. 11719, 92nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).
419 117 CONG. REc. S 4070 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1971). Representative Jonathan B. Bing-
ham (D-N.Y.), a sponsor of the Muskie-Symington legislation, has declared the measure "only
equitable and. . . in the best interests of all of the American public and of our political system."
117 CoNG. REc. H6014 (daily ed. June 29, 1971). Representative Jerome R. Waldie (D-Cal.)
believes that both business leagues and "charitable" organizations are "among the most valu-
able sources of information and opinion that a Congressman has" and that "it is unreasonable
that Congress be expected not to have the benefit of their views." 117 CONG. RPc. H6822
(daily ed. July 15, 1971). See also remarks of Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy (D-D.C.), 117
CONG. REc. E9406 (daily ed. Sep. 9, 1971).
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to contain its leading members."42  To this central body of advisors could be
added department heads and chairmen of independent regulatory agencies as
required.
2. Similarly, establishment of a structured means by which the Congress
can participate in the decisions to involve the country in war. In addition to
legislation defining the President's power to commit the armed forces to hostil-
ities,4 21 the Congress should be represented at the consultation and advisory stages
of decision-making which precede engagements in foreign adventures. Thus,
Alfred de Grazia has suggested that the Congress elect one member to "share"
with the President "the power to retaliate against foreign aggression."4 22
3. Authorization of telecasting or radio broadcasting of floor debates in
both houses of the Congress on major legislation, to evoke greater public aware-
ness of the Congress' activities and to enhance Congress' educational function.
Likewise, a closed circuit broadcasting system should be installed on Capitol Hill
and elsewhere in the government complex, to enable members unable to attend
debates, staff, and interested government officials to follow the proceedings of
the Congress.
4. Minimize the delays in enactment of appropriations legislation. Early
each year, the White House budget requests for the following fiscal year (begin-
ning July 1) are transmitted to the Congress. The House Committee on Appro-
priations initiates legislative consideration of the proposed budget package by
subdividing the requests into fourteen portions, which are separately reviewed
by subcommittees and framed as separate appropriations measures. An unfortu-
nate result of this annual ritual, from the standpoint of governmental-federal,
state and local-administration, is that rarely does a fiscal year begin with all
appropriations measures even close to enactment. Of the 86 regular appropria-
tions bills enacted from 1964 to 1970, only six became law before the beginning
of the government's fiscal year.422 In the first session of the 91st Congress (1969),
for example, the House had not passed all of the fiscal year 1970 appropriations
bills even by December and the Senate had only approved one measure by the
opening of the fiscal year. The Congress should consider the institution of
separate legislative and appropriations periods during each annual session.424 The
yearly flowering of a cluster of appropriations bins creates legislative confusion
and funding delays, and this aspect of the budget-consideration process requires
urgent reform.
5. Change in the mode of publication of the Congressional Record to
reflect floor speeches and debate as actually spoken, and to print remarks that
are merely inserted in the Record in a different typeface, in a separate location,
420 E. CoRwiN, THE PRESmENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 297 (4th ed. 1957) (reprinted by
permission of the New York University Press, New York).
421 See text accompanying notes 327-41, supra.
422 A. SCHLESINGER AND A. DE GRAZA, supra note 13, at 65.
423 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS No. 8 (June 25, 1971), in
117 CONG. REC. S12806 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1971).
424 See S. 1875, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Some have proposed that the appropriations
requests of various regulatory agencies be submitted directly to the Congress. See S. 448, H.R.
656, H.R. 5443, 92nd Cong.. 1st Sess. (1971). For other suggestion see H.R. Res. 75, 80,
176, 241, and H.R. 4699, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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in brackets, or in similar fashion."2" Present practice not only makes no distinc-
tion between verbatim remarks and speeches subsequently inserted into the tran-
script of the general debate, but also enables members to retroactively change the
context or substance of their remarks as they finally appear in the Record. Mem-
bers in both the House and Senate have unlimited authority to revise their re-
marks, and revisions are so commonplace that Representative Robert C. Eck-
hardt (D-Tex.) has warned his colleagues that they can "actually mislead the
courts as to what the legislative history of a bill is in certain circumstances." 2 8
Not only does this practice muddle legislative histories but it is misleading-
especially when overabused-to the general public. As an illustration, the Con-
gressional Record of March 24, 1971, contains eight addresses by Sen. Birch
Bayh (D-Ind.) -who was in fact concluding a skiing trip to Colorado at the
time. 27 While allowance can be made for correction of grammatical and typo-
graphical errors, the Record should be converted into a faithful account of con-
gressional proceedings.
6. Abolishment of the practice in the House of considering legislation
emanating from the Committee on Ways and Means under "closed rules" 2 '
which prohibit amendments. It is inappropriate that one committee alone under-
takes the preparation of major legislation-in such fields as taxation, tariffs, and
international trade-for which the entire House bears responsibility. At a mini-
mum, the House membership should have the opportunity to vote separately on
each title of a bill under consideration.4 29
These and other suggestions of congressional "reforms"- organizational
changes and alterations in procedure and practice--are by no means exhaustive.
Depending upon one's conception of the ideal, model legislature and its role in
American government, many more reforms can be added to the list. Yet, as
Robert Bendiner has noted, "there is no dearth of prescriptions but only a general
reluctance to take medicine."4 ' This attests to the need for an effective repre-
sentative assembly; the means can reasonably be debated but the goal is clear.
IX. Congressional Reform: The Realistic Prospects
The Congress has taken many steps toward modernization since 1946,
although much remains to be done to bring the legislative branch into conform-
ance with the needs and demands of contemporary America. A survey of the
successes and failures in congressional reform over the past thirty years teaches
that, of all the "reforms" that are periodically advocated, reform of the legis-
lative branch comes the hardest. Executive Office reform and court reform, as
well as numerous issue reforms-tax reform, draft reform, education reform, and
425 See e.g., H.R. 10571, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
426 116 CONG. REc. H7388 (daily ed. July 29, 1970). See also remarks of Representative
John N. Erlenborn, Truth in the Congressional Record, 117 CONG. Rxc. Hi1285 (daily ed.
Nov. 18, 1971).
427 Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1971, at A7. For additional examples see Lyons, Hill Record
Doesn't Tell It Like It Is, Wash. Post, July 5, 1970, at A7.
428 See text accompanying note 237, supra.
429 See e.g., remarks of Representative Richard T. Hanna (D-Cal.) 116 CONG. REc. E7521
(daily ed. Aug. 11, 1970).
430 R. BENDINER, supra note 51, at 208.
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others-come and go with accomplishments but the Congress basically remains
the same.
There are several reasons as to why these circumstances persist (including
more exposure in the media, more public interest, and considerably more direct
relevance to the average citizen), although one is obvious: only the Congress can
reform itself. Congress frequently undertakes to reform an area of the law
(e.g., the Tax Reform Act of 1969) or direct the private sector to better conduct
its affairs in the public interest (e.g., the Occupational Health and Safety Act
of 1970) or to gratuitously instruct another branch of the federal government
on how to exercise its responsibilities (e.g., the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970). But the Congress is slow to put its own houses in order. Congressional
reform is-at best-infrequent reform because it is a bootstrapping process.
Senator Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) explains the aversion of the Congress in
general toward reorganization: "Left to its own devices, Congress will not take
action to do the job of self-reform which urgently needs doing. Too many
members have vested interests in maintaining the status quo."431 For congres-
sional reform to be accomplished, the acceptance-however grudging-of or
perhaps the withholding of opposition by the congressional leadership and/or
committee chairmen must be obtained. And, of course, men and women in
positions of power and influence are rarely willing to relinquish their stations
of authority to advance the general goal of "congressional reform." The reluc-
tance within the Congress to institute reforms and the accompanying disinclina-
tion to accept or comply with them has been illustrated threefold thus far in the
92nd Congress.
Minority Staffing
Among the hotly contested items which survived to enactment in the Legis-
lative Reorganization Act of 1970 was a provision earmarking at least one-third
of House standing committees' funds for appointment of committee staff person-
nel solely by the minority party.432 This addition to the House rules, which was
adopted on a floor amendment offered by Representatives Fred Schwengel (R-
Iowa) and Frank Thompson (D-N.J.),"" represented an effort to build into
the committee system an improved and more dynamic adversary process, an
aspect of congressional reform championed by the Republican party since 1962.
The adoption of this provision was considered a victory for the proponents of
"minority staffing."
However, on January 20, 1971, on the eve of the convening of the 92nd
Congress, House Democrats, in their caucus, voted to support repeal of the
minority staffing funding provision and further invoked the rarely used "binding
caucus" rule, thereby obligating all Democrats to adhere to that position at the
time of the House vote. 4 Once the current Congress opened, the House, on
431 Case, The Crowing Concern With the Legislative Process, 32 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 929,
931 (1964).
432 See text accompanying note 207, supra.
433 116 CONG. Rac. H6750 (daily ed. July 15, 1970).
434 Under the rules of the House Democratic caucus, a member who votes in contradiction
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January 22, 1971, voted 226 (all Democrats)to 155 (all Republicans) to, inter
alia, delete the minority staffing provision. 435
The question of funding requirements for staff for the minority party is not
one-sided (many believe, for example, that the majority party alone has the right
and responsibility for organizing the Congress) and the dialogue over the pro-
priety of such a funding rule is far from quieted.43 It is unfortunate, nonethe-
less, that the majority party resorted to the harsh device of the caucus unit rule
to stifle open discussion on repeal of an untried House rule enacted by the pre-
vious Congress. This crude parliamentary tactic worked to deny individual
House members an opportunity to vote as their conscience and constituency may
have wished, and serves to further erode public confidence in the ability of the
Congress to perform its deliberative functions.
Conference Rules
Only six months after operation under the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1970 was under way, a set of House-Senate conferees apparently violated an
integral provision of the new House rules. These rules now provide a clear defini-
tion of the authority of conference committees to adjust differences in legislation
between the House and Senate versions, by stating that a report of conferees
shall not include matter not committed to the conference committee by
either House, nor shall their report include a modification of any specific
topic, question, issue, or proposition committed to the conference committee
by either or both Houses if that modification is beyond the scope of that
specific topic, question, issue, or proposition as so committed to the confer-
ence committee.43 7
The issue arose in connection with the manner in which House-Senate con-
ferees reconciled provisions of the House and Senate bills to extend the military
to caucus direction is automatically excluded from the caucus (and thereby loses committee
seniority), unless he states in advance of the House vote that he considers the proposal uncon-
stitutional or that he had previously pledged to his constituents that he would adopt a con-
trary position. The caucus rules are reprinted at 117 CoNo. Rac. Hlll (daily ed. Jan. 25,
1971).
435 H.R. Res. 5, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Rule XI, clause 32(c) now reads: "The mi-
nority party on any such standing committee [other than House Appropriations] is entitled to
and shall receive fair consideration in the appointment of committee staff personnel pursuant
to each such primary or additional expense resolution."
436 Resolutions to re-enact the minority staffing funding provision were introduced by 155
Republican House Members on June 22, 1971. H.R. Res. 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505,
and 506, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See 117 CONG. Rac. H5721 (daily ed. June 22, 1971).
437 House Rule XXVIII, clause 3(2), added by the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970 (see text accompanying note 196, supra). This section of the Act originated as an
amendment offered by Representative B. F. Sisk (D-Cal.), the floor manager of the bill.
-gee 116 CONG. REc. H8703 (daily ed. Sep. 15, 1970). During debate, Representative Sisk
stated that his amendment "simply proposes to make it impossible to bring in new material,
material that has not been considered in one or the other body's consideration of the matter,"
and attempts "to make certain that the proceedings of a conference committee which is held in
executive session cannot go beyond the scope of what the committees of the two bodies in their
floor debate held in the initial handling of the legislation." 116 CONG. Rc. H8703-4 (daily
ed. Sep. 15, 1970).
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draft.4 3 8 Both the House and Senate had approved an annual military pay in-
crease of approximately $2.7 billion, but through different formulas; the con-
ferees settled on about $2.4 billion. The conference committee, in effecting this
reduction, ignored earlier-established congressional intent concerning the concept
of "regular military compensation"4 s9 and relied on an outmoded distinction
between basic military pay and quarters allowance440 (the Senate had voted most
of its increases in basic pay and for an enlistment bonus, and the House in both
basic pay and quarters and subsistence allowances). The conferees, of course,
asserted that they attempted to individually adjust each of the different pay
elements at issue and that the reduction in the total annual cost was purely
incidental. 44'
Representative William A. Steiger (R-Wis.)sought to raise a point of order
against the compromise version of the military pay increases.44 2  Initially, the
House Committee on Rules, in writing the resolution governing consideration of
the draft legislation, refused to waive points of order against the contested pro-
visions, but subsequently reversed itself and granted the waivers pursuant to advice
from the Parliamentarian of the House that, should a point of order against the
compromise be upheld, the full conference report would be returned to the con-
ference committee. Thus, the House approved the conference report on the
military draft extension bill-including the conferees' reductions-on August 4,
1971, and the Senate passed the final version on September 21, 1971. But this
example of adroit parliamentary maneuvering leaves the future viability of the
new conference report rule uncertain; as Representative Steiger remarked, "as a
proponent of the Legislative Reorganization Act, I fear that this reform [concern-
ing conferees' reports] will be rendered meaningless." 443
Subcommittee Chairmanships
Still another example of the negative spirit in which the House received its
new rules is the ultimately unsuccessful attempt by Representative Chet Holi-
field (D-Ca.), to thwart a move by the House Democratic caucus to make more
subcommittee chairmanships available to junior members. The caucus approved
a rule which confines an otherwise eligible Democrat House member to chair-
manship of no more than one "legislative" subcommittee.
But Representative Holifield, the new chairman of the House Committee
on Government Operations, sought to deny chairmanships to younger members
by decreeing that five of his committee's subcommittees (then headed by mem-
bers who were chairmen of other subcommittees) were "investigative" not
"legislative' and thus not bound by the caucus rule, and by consolidating the
438 H.R. 6531, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
439 See e.g., H.R. Rnp. No. 90-787, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968).
440 See remarks of Representative William A. Steiger (R-Wis.) 117 CONG. Rxc. H6426(daily ed. July 7, 1971).
441 See, e.g., remarks of Senate John C. Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 117 CONG. Rac. S14105 (daily ed. Sep. 10, 1971). See Friedman, The Draft
Uncompromise, NEWSWEEK, Sep. 6, 1971, at 117 CONG. Rac. E9296 (daily ed. Sep. 8, 1971).
442 See 117 CONG. Rac. E8758 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1971) (remarks of Representative Steiger
in the House on August 2, 1971).
443 117 CONG. Rac. H6426 (daily ed. July 7, 1971).
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two most important subcommittees, with himself as chairman.4" However, the
original task force which initially developed this and other changes for the Demo-
cratic caucus was reconvened for the purpose of clarifying the rule on subcom-
mittee chairmanships. Representative Holifield subsequently abided by the
clarified version of the rule.
X. Conclusion
Despite the potential reorganizations of the legislative branch which are in
varying stages of consideration,"4 5 there is nothing to indicate that large-scale
congressional reforms are in the offing. The permanent Joint Committee on Con-
gressional Operations is not inclined at this juncture to embark on a campaign
for extensive reform and the members of the Congress most uniquely situated
to bring about significant reforms are generally indisposed to do so. As Dean
Ernest S. Griffith has warned, "[a]ncient procedures are jealously guarded by
those who have learned how to use them."' 446
Clearly, then, the energetic efforts of many of the younger members of the
House and Senate notwithstanding, for meaningful congressional reform to be-
come a reality, a more active interest in the Congress and its processes on the
part of the general public-and, specifically, the legal profession-must be stimu-
lated. Unfortunately, this development is not imminent either. Several years
ago, two commentators wrote: "Congress has had little interest in reforming
itself, and the public has been largely indifferent." 47  Some progress has been
made on the first-mentioned front, none on the latter.
The American people must come to expect and demand that the Congress
fully participate in the formulation of national policy and not avoid the larger
issues or not respond to presidential requests with reflex affirmations. (Senator
William Proxmire recently displayed the appropriate attitude when, in discussing
the nature of wage and price controls following expiration of the administration's
ninety-day "freeze," he said: "I think we [the Congress] should step in and
formulate some sort of framework." '448 ) However, such expectations and de-
mands may be idly made if the public continues to tolerate the Congress' plod-
ding reliance on obsolete traditions and inadequate procedures. William Pfaff,
of the Hudson Institute, writes that if "we really take seriously the argument that
this country is experiencing a serious political crisis, and that the crisis derives
from uses and misuses of power, then a restructuring of power and of the in-
444 See Viorst, Holifield's Naked Power Grab, (Washington) Evening Star, Mar. 1, 1971,
at A9.
445 See Parts III and VII.
446 E. GRIFFITH, supra note 36, at 74.
447 Rogow and Temple, Congressional Government: Legislative Power v. Democratic Pro-
cesses, 32 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 947 (1964). Senator Hubert H. Humphrey has proposed a
Citizen's Committee to Study Congress in S. 2728, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); see his
remarks at 117 CoNo. REc. S 16612-5 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1971).
448 As quoted in the Wash. Post, Sep. 20, 1971, at Al. The Congress, in extending the
President's power to control wages and prices until April 30, 1973, imposed only moderate
eccnomic controls or exemptions of its own; see the Economic Stabilzation Act of 1971,
S. 2891, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also Mathias, The Optional Congress, III RiPor
Fonum (No. 13) 3 (1971), reprinted at 117 CONG. REc. S20975-6 (1971).
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stitutions of public accountability is necessarily implied."44  Merlo J. Pusey, in
his study of how the nation goes to war, concluded that the "first avenue of
hope for restoring legislative control over the making of war lies in the develop-
ment of a lusty public opinion."'" To paraphrase Mr. Pusey, the first avenue
of hope for restoration of the United States Congress as a sensitive and produc-
tive participant in the shaping of national affairs lies in the development and ar-
ticulation of a lusty public opinion.
The Congress is nearing completion of the first two centuries of its existence.
The 100th Congress presumably will adjourn late in 1988, thus closing this na-
tion's first two hundred years of representative government.-5, The Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970 was the product of nearly six years' work; if the
Congress of the 1980's is to have effective legislative procedures, access to material
information, a responsible oversight of government, and the capacity to compe-
tently represent its constituencies in the national government, the time to begin
is now.
449 Pfaff, Less Rhetoric, More Reform, Wash. Post, Sep. 26, 1971, at El, E4.
450 M. Pussy, supra note 14, at 167.
451 Since the inception of the Congress in 1789, each Congress has had a duration encom-
passing two years, usually with the years of a particular Congress marked by a first and second
session. This pattern has been firmly adhered to since the 77th Congress, which commenced in
1941. However, 24 Congresses held three sessions within two years and one (the 67th) had
four.
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